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INTRODUCTION

The primary goal of any tax system is to raise sufficient revenue
for government.1 More precisely, taxation is the means by which
government supplies necessary things not available from the private
market. 2 Taxation allows society to cure distributional imperfections

in the market. It is appropriate, therefore, only to the extent that the
market cannot provide goods and services for which there is public
demand; if private markets equitably supplied food, shelter, health
care, education, and common defense, taxes could be greatly reduced
if not completely eliminated. The revenue raising goal is thwarted to

the extent the taxing system is either inefficient or inequitable.
Inefficiency decreases gross national product' and inequity spurs
1 "We have lost sight of the fact that the fundamental purpose of our tax
system
is to raise revenues to fund government." THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON
FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix
AMERICA'S SYSTEM, at xiii (2005) [hereinafter PANEL REPORT], available at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/. Joseph Sneed listed seven purposes, of
which raising revenue was first:

(1) to supply adequate revenue, (2) to achieve a practical and workable
income tax system, (3) to impose equal taxes upon those who enjoy equal
incomes, (4) to assist in achieving economic stability, (5) to reduce
economic inequality, (6) to avoid impairment of the operation of the
market-oriented economy and (7) to accomplish a high degree of harmony
between the income tax and the sought-for political order.
Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteriaof Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567,568
(1965) (emphasis omitted).
2 This more precise conceptualization allows
for the redistribution and behavior
modification (i.e., by favoring certain markets over others) goals that animate the tax
code. Redistribution and behavior modification are, in fact, public goods that cannot
be had via the private market place. Government must therefore raise revenue to
purchase those goods. Ultimately, then, taxation is exclusively for the purpose of
raising revenue, although merely as a means to other ends. "Taxation has always
been both about revenue and equity - about effectively raising government funds and
fairly distributing fiscal burdens." Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern
American FiscalState: Progressive-EraEconomists and the Intellectual Foundationsof
the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793, 1797 (2005).
3 The meaning of "efficiency" is discussed in greater
detail below. For now,
though, it suffices to quote Professors Lazear and Poterba, writing in the Wall Street
Journal:
A tax system should generate the government's required revenue with as
little economic distortion as possible, while distributing tax burdens fairly.
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resentment and avoidance.4 Both consequences - inefficiency and
inequity - interfere with the market's ability to supply goods and
services and have the perverse effect of provoking more tax levies.
The two secondary concerns - efficiency and equity - need not be

mutually exclusive, though it is sometimes argued that the pursuit of
equity decreases efficiency and vice versa.'

Progressive taxation

It should not discourage work, saving, or entrepreneurship more than is
necessary, and it should not discourage individuals from acquiring skills and
education that will increase their productivity. It should not discourage
investment, or favor investments in one asset over those in another. In
short, an efficient tax system alters economic decision-making as little as
possible.
Edward P. Lazear & James M. Poterba, A Golden Opportunity, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1,
2005, at A16. The writers are both members of the President's Advisory Panel on
Federal Tax Reform. See supra note 1.
4 Equity is actually a component of efficiency. See PANEL REPORT supra
note 1,
at 36-37 (including "fairness" in the discussion of an efficient tax system). If
taxpayers engage in active resistance or avoidance because they believe a tax system
is inequitable, the tax system will be forced to respond by getting and then spending
more to combat that resistance or avoidance, and/or increasing the rates of tax on
those who are unable to successfully resist or avoid the system, thereby inducing
further resistance and avoidance. John Braithwaite, for example, laments the
inevitable result of inequity, generated by tax shelter activities that provoke further
avoidance amongst those who believe others are getting away with tax avoidance:
Fiscal termites breed moral termites. Public opinion has not been oblivious
to these structural shifts - in an admittedly unsophisticated way, ordinary
people have noticed them and resent them deeply. As a result, the problem
of top-down tax avoidance.., is compounded by bottom-up tax evasion detectable growth in most societies in the size of the underground economy
as ordinary people fight back, for example, by using cash transactions and
barter to void tax.. .While most people are crudely but acutely aware of
the existence of tax shelters that are available to the rich but not to them,
their response is not political resistance so much as privatized cheating in
smaller ways they can manage to get away with.
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 31 (2005).
5 Perhaps Henry Simons made this point
best:
The case for drastic progression in taxation must be rested on the case
against inequality - on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevailing
distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree (and/or kind) of
inequality which is distinctly evil or unlovely.
Such a view obviously takes account merely of the distributional effects of
progression. Indeed, that is as far as traditional discussions of justice in
taxation may properly go. Yet this is obviously but one side of the
problem. The degree of progression in a tax system may also affect
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seems inequitable because it imposes disparate nominal burdens on
6
taxpayers. One explanation, of course, is that the marginal utility of
each dollar is greater to lower earners than to higher earners. The
nominally higher extraction from higher earners is equal to the
8
nominally lower extraction from lower earners. Equity is thereby
preserved or attained and, assuming progressive rates are set at
optimal levels, the tax system should nevertheless achieve its revenue
raising goal.9
production and the size of the national income available for distribution. In
fact, it is reasonable to expect that every gain, through taxation, in better
distribution will be accompanied by some loss in production. The real
problem of policy, thus, is that of weighing the one set of effects against the
other.
HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 18-19 (1938).
6 The most enduring indictment of progressive
taxation is contained in Walter
J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L.
REV. 417 (1952). A more contemporary attack is provided in Jeffrey A. Schoenblum,
Tax Fairness or Unfairness:A Consideration of the PhilosophicalBases for Unequal
Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221 (1995). This paper, of course, is not
about progressive taxation, per se. This paper assumes that progressive taxation is
desirable and then conceptualizes the inefficiency and inequity of partnership
allocations as an attack on progressivity.
7 See Sneed, supra note 1, at 575-77 (concisely describing the basic rationale for
progressive taxation). The scholarly literature regarding progressive taxation is
voluminous and exhaustive. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect
and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1021 n.109 (2004) (listing numerous books
and articles regarding progressive taxation).
8 The "benefit" and "ability to pay" theories are also used to justify
progressive
taxation. Very simply stated, those with the most wealth are deemed to benefit most
from public goods and therefore should pay more taxes.
9 That equity and efficiency can co-exist, though not universally accepted, has
been previously asserted:
The absence of a linear relationship between effort, ability, and
compensation in winner-take-all markets lends special force to arguments
that rest on diminishing marginal utility of money. Even a model that
makes conservative assumptions about the rate at which the marginal utility
of money declines shows that in winner-take-all markets progressive
taxation results in greater total private utility after taxes than proportional
taxation. In a society dominated by winner-take-all markets, then, we do
not need to trade equity for efficiency. Progressive income taxation can
provide both.
Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case
for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 10-11 (1998). Legal economists state the
rough equilibrium goal as though equity and efficiency are mutually dependent:
One, laws should be arranged so as to maximize social welfare, that is, to
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The equal burden justification is entirely familiar and widely
accepted, at least as a political matter.'0 The debate is more often
about the degree of progressivity than whether progressive rates are

appropriate. Ideally, equity and efficiency exist in rough equilibrium
when presumptively correct progressive rates are appropriately
enforced." The tax code, broadly defined, contains rules and doctrine
serve "efficiency." Two, the tax system should be used to redistribute
social resources so as to maximize the sum of individual well-being, that is,
to serve "equity." The two-part approach satisfies a paretian constraint:
The greater social pie facilitated by the first step can be used in the second
step's redistribution to assure that no one is harmed by any reform.
Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Tax Policy in an Era of Rising Inequality:
The PoliticalPsychology of Redistribution,52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1746-47 (2005); see
also Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On The Limits of Redistributive Taxation:
Establishinga Casefor Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1, 18-21 (2005)
(making the case that the most efficient legal rule can lead to the most inequity).
10 That the progressive tax remains politically normative is demonstrated by the
continuing failure to adopt a flat tax despite quadrennial calls for the adoption of a
truly flat tax. See generally Stephen B. Cohen, The Vanishing Case for Flat Tax
Reform: Growth, Inequality, Saving, and Simplification, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 819
(1999). Even recent proposals for tax reform retain some degree of progressivity.
For example, The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform offered two
proposals that might generally be described as consumption taxes, both of which
retain graduated rates, though at much lower levels than have previously existed.
PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at xiv.
As one of the main proponents of the Flat Tax has commented, the Flat
Tax "name is brilliant marketing, but it fails to convey the central feature of
the idea relative to a VAT [value added tax] - the Flat Tax is progressive."
The Flat Tax is progressive because the individual tax applies only above an
exemption amount. Low-income workers, therefore, do not pay tax on
their compensation to the extent it falls below the exemption amount. The
Flat Tax is most commonly proposed using a single rate tax rate that applies
to both businesses and workers above the exemption level. However, the
Flat Tax can be made even more progressive by using multiple graduated
rates at the individual level.
Id. at 39-40. While it is safe to conclude that scholars and policy makers still
generally agree that progressive taxation is appropriate and desirable, there are
significant objections put forth. For useful summaries of the growing scholarly
objections to progressive taxation beginning during the early 1980s and today, see
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement:
A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987) and Ajay K. Mehrotra,
Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-EraEconomists and the
Intellectual Foundationsof the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005).
1 Zelanak and Moreland note that "optimal income tax analysis provides
sophisticated mathematical techniques for finding the tax and transfer system that
best balances the utility gains from income redistribution against the efficiency losses
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designed to defend presumptively correct progressive rates despite
whatever efficiency losses are occasioned thereby.12 Ironically, the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) knowingly tolerates substantial
breachesS• in13those defenses because subchapter K, the partnership tax
provisions, contains easily exploitable statutes and regulations by
which taxpayers may avoid their appropriate tax burden. 14 The
from the disincentive effect of taxation." Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland,
Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAx L. REV. 51,
51-52 (1999); see also Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal
Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1077-79 (2004) (disputing the notion that equity and
efficiency are mutually exclusive).
12 Indeed, one of the arguments against progressive rates is that they
"lead to
complex tax laws in order to forestall the shifting of income from one taxable year to
another, or from one taxable unit to another." Kornhauser, supra note 10, at 471. See
infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for more detail regarding the tax doctrines
designed to protect progressive rates.
13 Subchapter K consists of I.R.C.
§§ 701-777.
14 The particulars of tax avoidance made possible by subchapter K are discussed
in Part III. There is a significant but still manageable body of scholarship regarding
the extent to which partnership allocations condone tax avoidance. Representative
articles are cited here merely for introductory purposes and to highlight a theme:
Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation, 47 TAX L. REV. 105, 108 (1991)
("'[T]o keep tax planners from wholly abusing the partnership's privileged status,
while not denying them all remaining flexibility, Congress and Treasury have had to
fashion a statutory and regulatory apparatus which, despite its genius, has become
one of the most inaccessible and burdensome features of the entire tax system.");
Edward J. Buchholz, Substantiality Under I.R.C. 704(b) - Some Forgotten Issues and
Some Ancient Concepts Revisited, 19 VA. TAX REV. 165,235-36 (1999) ("Late in 1994,
after surviving protracted attacks by practitioners and others, the Service finalized socalled partnership anti-abuse regulations ostensibly intended to stop a series of
transactions taking advantage of specialized basis rules in Subchapter K and the
ambivalent treatment of partnerships as either entities or aggregates."); Laura
Cunningham, Use and Abuse of 704(c), 3 FLA. TAX REV. 93 (1996) (describing the
gain and loss shifting potential under partnership taxation and the regulatory
response thereto); Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46
TAX L. REV. 1 (1990) ("The flexibility of subchapter K, one of its most celebrated
features, has given partners license to shift income and loss among themselves and
dispose of assets while deferring recognition of gain in ways that are not otherwise
possible under the income tax."); Mark P. Gergen, The End of the Revolution in
Partnership Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 343, 355 (2003) ("The usual criticism of the system
of capital accounts analysis [in partnership taxation] is that it weakly regulates special
allocations. The system can be gamed by offsetting allocations."); Jeffrey L. Kwall,
Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAx LAw. 229, 232 (1998) ("The
flexible partnership tax regime was designed to accommodate relatively simple
economic undertakings. Over the years, sophisticated taxpayers have entered into a
variety of tax-motivated arrangements that exploited this flexibility."); Richard M.
Leder, Tax Driven PartnershipAllocations With Economic Effect: The Overall After-
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existence of partnership tax provisions that make progressive rates
very nearly optional belies the apparent agreement with regard to
progressivity, particularly with respect to taxpayers whose livelihood
is funded primarily by stored capital rather than by labor.
A tax system is perfectly equitable, incidentally, if each person
subject to its rules bears an equal share of aggregate societal costs,
taking into account relative incomes." Equity losses occur when some
taxpayers systematically avoid paying their appropriate share.
Unnecessarily high equity losses are intrinsic to subchapter K's
substantial economic effect safe harbor 16 while efficiency gains from
that harbor are questionable at best. In short, the substantial
economic effect safe harbor allows partners to divide the tax benefits
and burdens from their joint economic activity in any manner that is
not cerebrally motivated, in the first instance, by tax reduction." Any

Tax Present Value Test for Substantiality and Other Considerations,54 TAx LAW. 753,
754 (2001) ("There are numerous situations in which U.S. tax benefits among partners
may be optimized through special allocations, allocations that would not be made, but
for the tax effect...."); Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms:
Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 249, 250 (1999) ("The
flexibility of the original conduit model facilitated devices to shift income, deductions,
and other tax attributes from partner to partner and from property to property in
ways that Congress found unacceptable."); Walter D. Schwidetzky, The Partnership
Allocation Rules of Section 704(b): To Be or Not to Be, 17 VA. TAX REV. 707, 708
(1998) ("Some members of the legal academic community (the 'academy') have been
critical of the substantial economic effect regulations, arguing that they permit the
taxpayers to avoid taxation in ways that would not be possible outside the partnership
context."); Stephen Utz, Allocation and Reallocation in Accordance with the Partners'
Interests in the Partnership,56 TAX LAW. 357 (2003) ("Commentators agree that the
[partnership tax allocation] guidelines are vague and puzzling.").
15 Sneed, supra note 1, at 579. I have, of necessity, greatly simplified a concept
- equality - that is most likely incapable of consensus. This article assumes, as an
equity baseline, that the distribution of tax burdens under the individual income tax
represents society's determination of "equity," however defined. A system of
taxation that deviates from that determination is therefore presumptively unfair and
illegitimate in the absence of efficiency gains that compensate for the unfairness. See
infra note 30 and accompanying text. For an exploration of the metaphysical, political
and historical consideration of equity as it relates to tax law, see Maureen B.
Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415 (2003) and Victor
Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAx L. REV. 45 (1990).
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(ii) (2005).
17 The details of the substantial economic effect test are discussed in Part III.
The voluminous regulatory language is set out below so the reader may refer to it as
needed:
(2) Substantial economic effect
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(i) Two-part analysis. The determination of whether an allocation of
income, gain, loss, or deduction (or item thereof) to a partner has
substantial economic effect involves a two-part analysis that is made as of
the end of the partnership taxable year to which the allocation relates.
First, the allocation must have economic effect (within the meaning of
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section). Second, the economic effect of the
allocation must be substantial (within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2)(iii)
of this section).
(ii) Economic effect
(a) Fundamentalprinciples. In order for an allocation to have economic
effect, it must be consistent with the underlying economic arrangement of
the partners. This means that in the event there is an economic benefit or
economic burden that corresponds to an allocation, the partner to whom
the allocation is made must receive such economic benefit or bear such
economic burden.
(b) Three requirements. Based on the principles contained in paragraph
(b)(2)(ii)(a) of this section, and except as otherwise provided in this
paragraph, an allocation of income, gain, loss, or deduction (or item
thereof) to a partner will have economic effect if, and only if, throughout
the full term of the partnership, the partnership agreement provides (1) For the determination and maintenance of the partners' capital accounts
in accordance with the rules of paragraph (b)(2)(iv) of this section,
(2) Upon liquidation of the partnership (or any partner's interest in the
partnership), liquidating distributions are required in all cases to be made
in accordance with the positive capital account balances of the partners, as
determined after taking into account all capital account adjustments for the
partnership taxable year during which such liquidation occurs (other than
those made pursuant to this requirement (2) and requirement (3) of this
paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(b)), by the end of such taxable year (or, if later, within
90 days after the date of such liquidation), and
(3) If such partner has a deficit balance in his capital account following the
liquidation of his interest in the partnership, as determined after taking into
account all capital account adjustments for the partnership taxable year
during which such liquidation occurs (other than those made pursuant to
this requirement (3)), he is unconditionally obligated to restore the amount
of such deficit balance to the partnership by the end of such taxable year
(or, if later, within 90 days after the date of such liquidation), which amount
shall, upon liquidation of the partnership, be paid to creditors of the
partnership or distributed to other partners in accordance with their
positive capital account balances (in accordance with requirement (2) of
this paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(b)).
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(iv)(2) (2005). The substantiality requirement invokes the
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division of tax benefits and burdens, even one that is motivated by and
in fact results in tax avoidance is permissible so long as the improper
tax avoidance intent is undetectable to a nearly blind and deaf
observer. Partnership tax could be administered without those high
equity losses if it were possible, instead, to articulate a reasonably
definitive method by which to assign partners' tax benefits and
burdens consistently with the incidence of partners' economic burdens
and benefits. Rather than the loose fitting, imprecise substantial
economic effect safe harbor, the Code could rely on the reasonably
definitive, better fitting test to more accurately measure each
partner's appropriate share of a partnerships' tax benefit or burden.
The better test would reduce unnecessary equity losses by decreasing
partners' ability to transfer or avoid their accurate tax benefit or
burden.
This article searches for an administrable and more accurate
method to determine each partner's tax benefit and burden. It
proposes that allocations, to be respected, must be strictly in
accordance with the partner's relative capital in the partnership
("capital account allocations"). Partners should be allowed to deviate
from capital account allocations only when they can prove that capital
account allocations are inconsistent with the division of economic

mental processes to which the word "cerebrally" relates:
(iii) Substantiality
(a) General rules.
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph
(b)(2)(iii), the economic effect of an allocation (or allocations) is
substantial if there is a reasonable possibility that the allocation (or
allocations) will affect substantially the dollar amounts to be received by
the partners from the partnership, independent of tax consequences.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the economic effect of an
allocation (or allocations) is not substantial if, at the time the allocation
becomes part of the partnership agreement, (1) the after-tax economic
consequences of at least one partner may, in present value terms, be
enhanced compared to such consequences if the allocation (or allocations)
were not contained in the partnership agreement, and (2) there is a strong
likelihood that the after-tax economic consequences of no partner will, in
present value terms, be substantially diminished compared to such
consequences if the allocation (or allocations) were not contained in the
partnership agreement. In determining the after-tax economic benefit or
detriment to a partner, tax consequences that result from the interaction of
the allocation with such partner's tax attributes that are unrelated to the
partnership will be taken into account.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a) (2005).
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benefits and burdens.' 8 Frankly, the difference between this proposal
and prior proposals is slight. The capital account allocation method
replaces the substantial economic effect test as the safe harbor but,
unlike prior proposals, is not mandatory in the strictest sense. If
partners can show that allocations in accordance with capital accounts
would be inconsistent with their relative accessions to wealth, they
should be allowed to make special allocations under a more
definitively articulated special allocation test.
Thus, special
allocations are not prohibited but subjected to a very strong negative
presumption, and the burden of proof with regard to non-capital
18 Present

law

effectively

creates

a

presumption

that

allocations

disproportionate to contributed capital are consistent with the economic arrangement
and then places a nearly impossible burden on the tax collector of proving the
taxpayer's illegitimate intent.
See Kwall, supra note 14, at 243 ("When
[disproportionate] allocations are sanctioned by a system that taxes all business
income to the owners of the enterprise, the burden falls on the tax law to identify the
economic relations of the owners. Such a system inevitably is quite complicated and
creates potential for abuse."). Castle Harbour v. Commissioner contains a stark
example of the effect of a positive presumption in favor of disproportionate
allocations coupled with a nearly insurmountable government burden to prove the
mental state of the taxpayer. Castle Harbour v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 94 (D. Conn.
2004). In that case, the disproportionate allocation allowed the taxpayer to defer
recognition of nearly $64,000,000. See generally Karen C. Burke, Castle Harbour:
Economic Substance and The Overall-Tax-Effect Test, 107 TAX NOTES 1163 (May 30,
2005); Darryll K. Jones, Castle Harbourand The Hobgoblins of Little Minds, 106 TAX
NOTES 605 (Jan. 31, 2005). The opinion in Castle Harbour candidly admits that the
taxpayer, as a result of the government's failure to disprove the propriety of
disproportionate distributions, received a windfall tax benefit without having incurred
a corresponding economic burden. Castle Harbour, 342 F.2d at 121 ("In short, the
transaction, though it sheltered a great deal of income from taxes, was legally
permissible. Under such circumstances, the I.R.S. should address its concerns to
those who write the tax laws.").
19 Most of the scholarly proposals to date would categorically
disallow
disproportionate allocations. See Berger, supra note 14 (proposing that all small
business - as determined by income - be taxed under a modified version of
subchapter S, which does not allow disproportionate allocations); Gergen, Reforming
Subchapter K, supra note 14 (proposing that disproportionate allocations be
categorically prohibited); Kwall, supra note 14 (proposing that disproportionate
allocations be categorically prohibited and imposing a single entity level tax on
"complex" private enterprises that would otherwise desire special allocations);
Lokken, supra note 14 (proposing to foreclose subchapter K to all business except
service, firms and allowing all other firms to elect a modified subchapter S taxing
regime); George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX
REV. 141 (1999) (proposing an optional subchapter K regime to small business
complying with certain ownership limitations and which may not make
disproportionate allocations).
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account allocations is more explicitly placed on those with the greatest
information access.
This article's larger purpose is to address the implicit efficiency
and equity assumptions that apparently underlie the continuing
reliance on the substantial economic effect safe harbor. Congress's
failure to adopt one or the other of the very good and defensible

proposals 20 implies that the case against the substantial economic
effect test has not been made. Indeed, each of the prior proposals

represents an improvement over the present system but their
proponents have devoted insufficient attention to proving the extent
to which the present system is both inefficient and inequitable. This

has allowed some to argue, with apparent success, that the benefits of
doing nothing outweigh the costs of change.21
This article defines efficiency from a macro standpoint. A tax

system is perfectly efficient if it maximizes aggregate social utility the most good for the most people.22 If the tax base is defined by
20 See supra note 19 for descriptions of proposals.
21 See Schwidetzky, supra note 14 (arguing that the substantial economic
effect

test prevents most realistic tax avoidance schemes); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing
the Fundamental Premises of PartnershipTaxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229 (1993)
(setting forth the efficiency defenses of subchapter K).
22 I will make reference to Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency below. See
infra
note 27 and accompanying text. For now, I adopt the very down-to-earth explanation
of efficiency provided by The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform:
What are efficiency costs? Finally, the income tax imposes EFFICIENCY
cOSTS on the economy. These costs arise when high tax rates discourage
work, savings, and investment; distort economic decisions of individuals
and businesses; and divert resources from productive uses in our
economy ....
When taxpayers change their behavior to minimize their tax liability, they
often make inefficient choices that they would not make in the absence of
tax considerations. These tax-motivated behaviors divert resources from
their most productive use and reduce the productive capacity of our
economy. Economic growth suffers as taxpayers respond to the tax laws
rather than to underlying economic fundamentals. These distortions waste
economic resources, reduce productivity, and, ultimately lower living
standards for all.
It would be difficult, however, to imagine a tax system that has no excess
burden.
Excess burden arises from people adopting less efficient
behavior ....
For this reason, it is clear that raising revenue through taxation requires
some distortions in the economy. One goal of good tax policy is to
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reference to personal consumption, or the potential thereof, the
making of economic expenditures and other instances of foregone
personal consumption are legitimate efficiency reasons to lessen a
The taxpayer's profit-seeking
taxpayer's relative tax burden. 23
expenditure (i.e., foregone personal consumption) increases aggregate
utility to a greater extent than if the taxpayer engaged in personal
consumption and paid a higher tax. The increased satisfaction of
societal needs reduces everyone's tax burden to a greater extent than
if the taxpayer engaged in personal consumption and paid a higher
tax. That is, the private satisfaction of societal needs is better than
governmental satisfaction of those needs. Overall, governmental
extraction and redistribution should decrease to the extent one
person's investment increases economic well-being for many others
who would otherwise depend on, and benefit from, higher
extractions.24 Thus, reducing extractions from the maker of economic
expenditures is an efficient means of paying for public needs.
The efficiency rationale explains why subchapter K allows
partners to determine for themselves the assignment of tax benefits
and burdens arising from partnership operations. It is thought most
efficient that partners be allowed to assign tax benefits and burdens
amongst themselves without government supervision or intervention,
provided they do so in a manner consistent with the natural division of
economic benefits and burdens arising from their joint activity.
Individuals do not have that level of freedom, at least not explicitly,
even in instances when it might be more efficient to grant that
authority to individuals." In fact, the rules pertaining to partnership
taxation have always demonstrated an inordinate solicitude for
efficiency, oftentimes at the expense of equity. Partnership tax
provisions allow implicit and tax-free economic exchanges for the sake
minimize these distortions within a "fair" tax structure. The trade-off
between fairness and efficiency in raising revenue is one of the central
challenges of designing a tax system.
PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 36-37 (emphasis in the original).
23 Thuronyi, supra note 15, at 56-57 (regarding the deductibility of expenses for
which no personal benefit is received).
24 Governmental extractions of income cannot be entirely eliminated because
certain public goods - highways and armies, for example - will never be adequately
produced by individual investment nor are they subject to inequitable distribution.
25 For example, the "kiddie tax" can be viewed as a severe ownership
diversification disincentive because it taxes the earnings from capital owned by a child
at the parent's marginal rate even in the absence of any tax shifting motivation.
I.R.C. § 1(g). A grandparent's entirely altruistic gift of stock to a child, for example,

might be delayed because of the negative tax consequences.
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of efficiency. The substantial economic effect safe harbor is the sole
limitation on partners' ability to engage in these exchanges and that
harbor is wide and deep. Individuals separately engaged in economic
activity are disadvantaged because they cannot engage in the same
activity without a tax cost.
Individuals should therefore be
compensated for this inequity via lower individual tax burdens. 2' That
is, there ought to be measurable efficiency gains if partners are to be
granted tax concessions not made available to individuals. The idea
implicit in the substantial economic effect safe harbor is that efficiency
gains obtained via exchanges occurring within a joint economic
activity, the tax benefits and burdens from which are left to the
partners' individual judgments, are spread throughout society and
ultimately reduce everyone else's tax burden.
The substantial
economic effect safe harbor, though, does not and cannot ensure that
result because it is too loosely defined.
Special allocations are defined broadly to include any division of
tax benefits and burdens disproportionate to the partners' relative
capital ownership. 28 If two partners have residual claims to equal
26 See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying
text.
27 If the advantages provided to partners via subchapter

K were Pareto efficient,
partners would be better off as a result of the tax-free implicit exchanges allowed
under subchapter K and individual taxpayers would be no worse off. See Christopher
T. Wonnell, Efficiency and Conservatism, 80 NEB. L. REV. 643,645 (2001). Individuals
are worse off, though, because they suffer a disutility (resentment) from the
knowledge that partners do not pay the same amount of taxes on the same income.
The advantages provided to partners via subchapter K would be efficient per Kaldor
and Hicks if the advantages provided to partners also worked to the advantage of
individual taxpayers so that everyone was better off. Id. at 646. All of this means that
the advantages obtained by partners should lessen the government's need for revenue
and therefore everyone's tax liability. I argue below that the substantial economic
effect test does not assure this result.
28 The text definition is consistent with the manner in
which the phrase, "special
allocations" is variously used in subchapter K. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.7043(e)(3)(iii)(A) (2005) (referring to non-pro rata allocations made by securities
partnerships) with Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2002) (referring to the need to
account for special allocations in determining a partner's percentage share of profits)
and Treas. Reg. § 1.731-2(b)(3)(ii) (1996) (referring to the special allocations with
regard to a distribution of marketable securities). See also Rudnick, supra note 21.
A special allocation is any allocation of an item or temporal preference for
income that varies from the partners' interests in the partnership. This
includes bottom-line income allocations and other forms, such as a division
of profits and losses that is different from the underlying capital in the firm,
or a special ratio for sharing profits and losses with respect to particular
partnership property or source of income.
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amounts of capital but divide the tax benefits and burdens differently,
they are making special allocations. The article accepts, for the sake

of argument, that allocations in accordance with relative capital are
not always optimally efficient and therefore should not be mandated

in all cases. Capital account allocations, however, are never inefficient
or inequitable and therefore should serve as the safe harbor rather
than the always inequitable, and rarely efficient, substantial economic
effect safe harbor. Partners who make the assertion, dubious though

it may be, that capital account allocations actually create inefficiency
(as opposed to being non-optimally efficient) should have the burden
of persuasion.

In this manner, equity losses arising from any

concession granted can be more precisely associated with efficiency
gains.
That

special

allocations

have

been

allowed

almost

since

partnerships were first recognized as distinct entities suggests that
whatever equity loss occurs is, in fact, equaled or exceeded by
efficiency gains.' 9 Efficiency gains resulting from an apparent inequity

ought to compensate for equity loss so that the rough, equityefficiency equilibrium is undisturbed in the aggregate.3 ° The easy and

persistent manipulation of the substantial economic effect safe harbor
to avoid progressive rates, by character shifts or deferral, and often
without efficiency gains, suggests the opposite is true. 3' Efficiency
29 For a history of special allocations dating back to 1919, see Rudnick, supra

note 21, at 373-76.
30 In such cases, we could conclude that advantages provided to partners are
Kaldor-Hicks efficient. See supra note 27. Legal economists implicitly recognize that
efficiency gains correspond with equity losses but that a rough equilibrium resulting in
neither inordinate efficiency nor equity losses can be achieved:
The fact that an efficient legal rule maximizes the size of the pie means - by
the usual argument that margins are zero at a maximum - that there will be
no marginal efficiency losses associated with moving off of the perfectly
efficient point. There will, however, be nonzero marginal equity effects
because, of course, the perfectly efficient point does not also maximize
equality. Indeed, moving off of the perfectly efficient point in the right
direction will positively reduce inequality on the margin.
The presence of marginal equity gains and the absence of marginal
efficiency losses means that perfect transfers are possible on the pure
efficiency margin.
Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructingthe New Efficiency Rationale,86 CORNELL
L. REV. 1003,1010 (2001).
3"Special
allocations can provide two different tax advantages. Allocations
which shift gain and loss take advantage of tax rate differences between partners by
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gains, if any, are greatly exceeded by equity losses particularly when
the substantial economic effect test renders economically nonsensical
investment nonetheless profitable on an after-tax basis. In the latter
instance, partners should be indifferent to efficiency as defined in this
article. If this is so, special allocations should be curtailed to the
extent necessary to restore the rough equilibrium between equity and
efficiency.
The substantial economic effect safe harbor, by which allocations
are analyzed for correctness, has never been viewed as the exclusive
mechanism to maintain the rough equilibrium between equity and
32
equilibrium.
Instead, the test is thought of as simply the best that
can be articulated and administered despite its notorious
ineffectiveness. In the absence of the substantial economic effect test,
or a better alternative, every single partnership and the Service would
be obliged to devote such resources to particularized determinations
as to render the partnership investment wholly inefficient.
Particularized determinations - made through an examination of
each partner's investment in, and rights and obligations with respect
to the partnership - are therefore mandated under present law only
when it is determined that a partnership's special allocations violate
the substantial economic effect safe harbor, 33 an unlikely occurrence
even if the partners intentionally seek conversion or deferral of
income. The looseness of the substantial economic effect safe harbor
disrupts the rough equilibrium and suggests the need for a more
accurate and equitable approach.
Previous attempts to define the appropriate way to accurately
assign tax benefits and burdens to partners have ignored or skipped
over the relationship between partnership taxation and individual
income taxation in general.34 Subchapter K, though, is not intended to
deferring income to the higher rate partner .... Character shifting allocations shift
income, gain, or loss on assets so that partners may take advantage of differences in
their character." Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 14, at 4; see also infra
note 122 and accompanying text.
32 See AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX
PROJECT:

SUBCHAPTER K 248-49 (1984) [hereinafter ALl PROJECT] (stating that the substantial

economic effect test should not be changed, but that underlying principles and
examples should be included in regulations).
33 I.R.C. § 704(b).
34 The comparison, instead, is most often between partnerships and other
types
of business associations, i.e., the entity versus the aggregate approach. See, e.g.,
Berger, supra note 14; Kwall, supra note 14; Taxation of Private Business Firms,supra
note 14; Yin, supra note 19. Comparing partnership taxation to the taxation of S or C
corporations tends to reduce the equity losses and increase the efficiency gains, at

1062

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:1047

create a new or free-standing tax but is merely a structural mechanism
by which to apply an existing individual income tax to an efficient and
frequently occurring context.35 In Part II, the article therefore
reconsiders the circumstances under which individuals are required to
bear the burden of a taxable income (positive income) or are granted
the benefit of a tax deduction (negative income) outside the
partnership concept. Prior efforts have neglected individual income
tax concepts such as constructive receipt and the assignment of
income doctrine. Those realization concepts are useful in determining
the extent to which a partner should be associated with tax benefits
and burdens derived through the partnership form. The doctrines
essentially confirm the notion that the incidence of income is
proportionate, never disproportionate, to the incidence of economic
ownership. An obvious but often forgotten point is that Congress
intends partners to be taxed exactly like individuals except when
significant efficiency concerns - significant enough to outweigh
equity losses - justify a departure. We therefore ought to remind
ourselves of the explicit circumstances in which individuals bear a tax
burden or are granted a tax benefit before articulating how to ensure
those benefits and burdens are accurately assigned after passing
through the partnership form. Then, we should remember that the
assignment of tax benefits and burdens amongst partners should differ
from the assignment of tax benefits and burdens amongst individuals
only if there is something about the pass-through that justifies or
necessitates a difference, and then only to the extent efficiency gains
36
compensate individuals for the inequity they suffer.
Part III proceeds from the established baseline and engages in a
critical analysis of the extent to which the substantial economic effect
safe harbor is efficient, increases aggregate utility, and maintains the
least insofar as the comparison is to C corporations.
35 Indeed, Congress's first decision to enact provisions related to partnership
taxation was motivated merely by the need to create uniform reporting amongst
individuals who conducted business via unincorporated associations. Bradley T.
Borden, Sandra Favelukes & Todd E. Molz, A History and Analysis of the Coownership-Partnership Question, 106 TAX NOTES 1175 (Mar. 7, 2005). Legal
economists also consider the partnership an extension of the sole proprietorship.
Rudnick, supra note 21, at 259-60 ("The partnership is an extension of the individual
savings model through an investment in a firm that deploys resources for production
and investment decisions and which is conceptualized as an extended sole
proprietorship.").
36 "Does there remain something special about the partnership that should
entitle partners to a degree of flexibility that the tax law allows neither corporate
shareholders nor cotenants?" Berger, supra note 14, at 131.
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equity-efficiency equilibrium. The substantial economic effect safe
harbor is entirely procedural. Although it is articulated in substantive
tax language, its impact is actually limited to the allocation of
compliance and enforcement resources. As such, it serves as a very
classic safe harbor akin to an internal policy memorandum regarding
the circumstances under which the tax collector will require further
explanation from any partner or partnership. That it is manifestly
procedural is not, by itself, sufficient to condemn the substantial
economic effect safe harbor as a useless tool. We should be cognizant,
though, of the familiar tax dichotomy concerning form and substance.
An assignment of a tax benefit or burden to a partner may meet the
substantial economic effect form perfectly and yet have little or no
relationship to the true substantive incidence of tax burdens and
benefits.3 7 It is inevitable that formal compliance will deviate from
substantive compliance with regard to any safe harbor. The objection
in this article is that the current amount of deviation is unnecessary.
The question becomes whether the cost associated with whatever
irreconcilable deviation exists between safe harbor and substance is
Are the compliance and
justified by the resulting benefit.
enforcement savings outweighed by losses arising from substantive
noncompliance? From an efficiency-equity standpoint, a safe harbor
is legitimate only to the extent its savings exceed its costs and then
only if the savings are significantly greater than the cost. If that
assertion is true, the case for the substantial economic effect test is
weak, indeed, and we should articulate a better test, even if the result
is not one as easily administered as the present safe harbor. If we are
to continue to use a safe harbor in partnership taxation, the
articulation of that safe harbor should be skewed more towards
substantive compliance than enforcement asset allocation.
Part IV returns to the axiom established in Part II - partners' tax
benefits and burdens should be the same as if the partners were
separately engaged individuals. The axiom underlies the current
"partner's interest in the partnership" (PIP) test.38 Ostensibly, the test

37 See generally Yin, supra note

19, at 154-65 (regarding the inherent
ineffectiveness of the substantial economic effect test).
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3) (2005). The exact language is set out for the
reader's convenience:
References in section 704(b) and this paragraph to a partner's interest in
the partnership, or to the partners' interests in the partnership, signify the
manner in which the partners have agreed to share the economic benefit or
burden (if any) corresponding to the income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit
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seeks to determine the incidence of the economic burden or benefit

and then associates the appropriate tax consequence with that
incidence.39 The association of tax and economic benefits and burdens
is, in fact, the overriding concern with respect to all partnership
allocations, so it would actually make sense that the PIP test would be

the exclusive means by which to determine each partner's share of the
partnership's aggregate tax benefit and burden.4n Unfortunately, the
test is considered so administratively burdensome that it is applied

only when the substantial economic effect safe harbor is breached .41
(or item thereof) that is allocated. Except with respect to partnership items
that cannot have economic effect (such as nonrecourse deductions of the
partnership), this sharing arrangement may or may not correspond to the
overall economic arrangement of the partners. (For example, in the case of
an unexpected downward adjustment to the capital account of a partner
who does not have a deficit makeup obligation that causes such partner to
have a negative capital account, it may be necessary to allocate a
disproportionate amount of gross income of the partnership to such partner
for such year so as to bring that partner's capital account back up to zero.)
Thus, a partner who has a 50 percent overall interest in the partnership may
have a 90 percent interest in a particular item of income or deduction. The
determination of a partner's interest in a partnership shall be made by
taking into account all facts and circumstances relating to the economic
arrangement of the partners. All partners' interests in the partnership are
presumed to be equal (determined on a per capita basis). However, this
presumption may be rebutted by the taxpayer or the Internal Revenue
Service by establishing facts and circumstances that show that the partners'
interests in the partnership are otherwise.
39 "References in section 704(b) and this paragraph to a partner's interest
in the
partnership, or to the partners' interest in the partnership, signify the manner in which
the partners have agreed to share the economic burden or benefit (if any)
corresponding to the income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof) that is
allocated." Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i) (2005). For a comprehensive discussion of
the partner's interest in the partnership test, see Stephen Utz, Allocation and
Reallocation in Accordance with the Partners' Interests in the Partnership, 56 TAX
LAW. 357 (2003).
40 Gregory J. Marich explains that the PIP test is essentially
a more accurate
variation of the substantial economic effect test:
The substantial economic effect test and the partner's interest in the
partnership standard should generally be viewed as two sides of the same
coin. Both are aimed at ensuring that tax consequences are allocated to the
partner or partners who will receive the benefit or bear the burden of the
related economic consequences.
Gregory J. Marich, Substantial Economic Effect and The Value Equals Basis
Conundrum,42 TAX L. REV. 509,510 (1987).
41 See Leder, supra note 14, at 753 (referring to the PIP test as a "black hole");
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The burden arises, though, because the PIP test assumes that
disproportionate allocations are legitimate in more instances than can
actually be proven. The substantial economic effect test is rightly
viewed, though, as an extreme opposite of the PIP test. As
demonstrated in Part III, the substantial economic effect test
condones the disproportionate assignments of tax benefits and
burdens that are only vaguely and coincidentally consistent with
economic burdens and benefits. The worthy premise of the PIP test is
that tax benefits and burdens should precisely correspond to economic
burdens and benefits, respectively. Part IV will show that the PIP test
is indeed an unduly sophisticated articulation of fundamental
realization concepts to a partnership setting and, as a result, achieves
no precision at all. The problem, again, is that the PIP test accepts the
notion that disproportionate allocations are, in the main, appropriate.
This article asserts the exact opposite and thereby simplifies the
meaning of a "partner's interest in the partnership."
As with
individual taxation, the partner who realizes income or loss should be
associated with the appropriate tax burden or benefit. The concept is
easy enough to apply to the infinite variety of individual taxpayer
circumstances without a distorting safe harbor, but it is viewed as
prohibitively difficult to apply to the smaller variety of partnership
circumstances. The language by which
the PIP
• •
42 test is articulated in
the regulations is particularly indecipherable.
It is hard to know
exactly what the drafters intended to convey without very close
scrutiny of the thirteen most relevant examples provided elsewhere in
the regulations. The drafters' inarticulateness notwithstanding, it
should be no more difficult to determine the incidence of economic
benefits and burdens incurred via a particular partnership (and thus
the appropriate division of tax benefits and burdens) than it is to
determine the incidence of economic benefits and burdens incurred by
individuals.43
Part V proceeds from the conclusion that it is possible to
articulate a reasonably definitive and administrable method by which
to accurately determine each partner's share of the partnership's
aggregate tax benefits and burdens. The substantial economic effect
test is often defended on the efficiency rationale that there are an
Marich, supra note 40, at 510 ("The substantial economic effect test thus serves as a
safe harbor, providing a degree of certainty that cannot be found in the amorphous
determination of a partner's interest in a partnership.").
42 See supra note 38, infra notes 138-48 and accompanying
text.
43 But see Yin, supra note 19, at 163-64 (asserting the impossibility
of
determining partner's economic burdens and benefits).
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infinite variety of legitimate arrangements between partners and a44
single, mandatory PIP test would interfere with those arrangements.
The subsequent assertion is that a single PIP test would be costly to
administer and therefore the substantial economic effect test, despite
its high equity loss, is most appropriate. The assertion is so well
accepted that there has never been an effort to refine the meaning of
PIP so as to render it feasible as an administrative matter. 45 The ease
with which tax benefits and burdens are assigned to individuals,
though, is a function of the notion that economic benefits are related
to relative ownership. An individual who owns 50% of Blackacre, for
example, is presumptively viewed as suffering 50% of the economic
and tax impact from Blackacre. There is no efficiency reason why this
easy rationale should not also apply in the partnership setting.
Certainly there may be as many varieties of partnerships as there
are individuals. Every partnership, though, prioritizes partners' risk in
a few finite ways very similar to the limited ways individuals allocate
risk - essentially via borrowing, and employment relationships.
Theoretically, then, each partner's annual tax benefit and burden can
be determined with little more difficulty than applies to the manner of
determining separate an individual's tax benefits and burdens.
Recognition of the finite ways by which to determine the incidence of
tax benefits and burdens, even benefits and burdens occurring from
joint profit-seeking, implies that it is possible to articulate an
administrable PIP test - based on distribution preferences, perhaps
- and thereby avoid the equity losses inherent to the substantial
economic effect test. The question this article ultimately addresses is
whether the efficiency gains from disproportionate allocations justify
the equity losses that would arise even from an administrable PIP test
that continued the present law view that disproportionate allocations
are appropriate more often than not. The article answers that
question in the negative, primarily because partners do not use special
allocations to effectuate the sort of risk sharing that is the hallmark of
partnership efficiency. Instead, partners use special allocations to
effectuate risk bargainingand trading, such as already occurs in arms
length bargaining between unrelated individuals. Special allocations
therefore do not add to aggregate utility; they merely increase
44 See, e.g., Buchholz, supra note 14, at
177-81.
45 In 1982, the American Law Institute sought to explicate the principles
that

should dictate the allocation of partnership items. ALl PROJECT, supra note 32, at
221-52. The Institute declined to propose any particular standard, preferring instead
to use 21 examples by which to demonstrate fifteen "guiding principles" and
"generalizations." Id. at 245-48.
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inequality. The conclusion, therefore, is that partners should not be
allowed to use special allocations, though the article hedges a bit in
recognition that it is impossible to definitively rule out the need for

special allocations in what must be the very rarest of cases.
II. INDIVIDUALS AND PARTNERS SHOULD BE TAXED ALIKE
The Haig-Simons definition of income as the "algebraic" sum of
consumption plus the change in value of stored property 46 implies that
individuals have positive or negative income because real numbers
can have positive or negative values.47 One complication inherent in

Haig-Simons, particularly as it relates to positive and negative income
obtained via a partnership, is that income is measured by reference to
increased or decreased
consumption potential as measured by money
,
-48

or money's worth.

It is useful to think of Haig-Simons as articulating

a consumption model, with consumption potential serving as a

substitute for actual consumption destined to occur. In most cases,
consumption potential is not too terribly difficult to observe, 49 but
inaccuracies necessarily increase along the farther continuum between
potential and actual consumption.

Hence, consumption potential is

invariably imprecise, even under the best of circumstances. 0 The
imprecision increases with the presence of an intermediary agent

46 SIMONS,

supra note 5, at 50.

47 Thuronyi, supra note 15, at 64 ("The unitary nature of income suggests
that it

is artificial to consider income separately from deductions. The fact that the Code
does so may be justified as a matter of mechanics of drafting, but that fact should not
be considered as having any further importance.").
48 The taxation of consumption potential is, of course, the primary objection to
the income tax. See generally Mitchell L. Engler, Progressive Consumption Taxes, 57
HASTINGS L. J. 55 (2005). Thus, all cash flows are subject to tax even if the cash flow is
not immediately converted into human consumption.
Under the theory of
consumption potential, a deduction is appropriate when subsequent events business investment or casualty loss for example - contradict the previous
assumption that all cash flows represent present or future consumption.
49 The realization requirement of our present system, of course,
creates
distortions with regard to consumption potential by assuming that increased or
decreased consumption potential occurs suddenly and momentarily (at the moment of
a market transaction) rather than on a continuous accretion basis. See Deborah H.
Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAx L. REv. 355 (2004).
50 To accurately measure consumption potential and thus income under
the
present system, we would need to know precisely how a taxpayer's cash flow or
increased value of stored property will be spent. We would then subtract from cash
flow and increased value those future expenses that did not confer a personal benefit
to arrive at "income." See supra note 47.
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(such as a partnership) between potential and actual consumption,
particularly when the intermediary has multiple principals to whom it
may assign the consumption potential with very little regulatory
oversight.5'
An individual's positive or negative consumption potential may
not coincide precisely with actual consumption. For example, if a
taxpayer earns $100, the U.S. system reacts as though she has, in fact,
consumed $100, even though she has only increased her consumption
potential. The taxpayer may incur or already know of a future
expense that will prevent her from enjoying the full potential, thereby
resulting in negative income. If a negative value in the Haig-Simons
equation results from personal consumption, the negative value is
perfectly offset by positive value coinciding with actual personal
consumption. For example, a decrease by $100 in the taxpayer's
monetary capital occasioned by the acquisition of $100 worth of
groceries results in neither negative nor positive income because the
assumption of inevitable personal consumption justifying a tax on the
$100 when received has been confirmed. If negative values do not
result from personal consumption, the taxpayer has negative income
to the extent of that value and should be granted a deduction." A
decrease by $100 in the taxpayer's monetary capital occasioned by a
$100 business expense contradicts the earlier assumption that the
taxpayer's $100 potential personal consumption would actually be
realized. The negative value contradicts an earlier determination
concerning consumption potential and represented by positive value
in the Haig-Simons formulation at that earlier point. In that instance,
the taxpayer has negative income and should be granted a deduction
to offset.
An important point in this basic, but fundamental discussion is
that negative and positive income is peculiar to each individual. One
person's income cannot and should not be ascribed to someone else
.' Thus, the inherent inaccuracy of the consumption potential method of
measuring income, aggravated by the realization rule, is even worse in the partnership
setting to the extent the partnership can decide whose potential consumption has
increased.
52 Actually, Haig-Simons does not anticipate or allow for deductions. It assumes
that all expenditures, for whatever purpose, generate personal consumption. As such,
deductions are anathema to Haig-Simons. Perhaps this is the reason it is often stated
that "an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace." See, e.g., Interstate
Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).
53 Cunningham, supra note 14, at 94 ("It is basic to income taxation that
each
taxpayer should be taxed on his or her own economic income and that only taxpayers
who suffer economic losses should derive tax benefits therefrom.").
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even in the absence of progressive rates. Equity requires that each
person personally pay their share of aggregate societal costs, not just

that the government extract an amount equal to aggregate societal
cost.14

This assertion, incidentally, is axiomatic and perhaps even
intuitive. If four individuals - Able, Baker, Charlie, and Delta each have equal incomes, how might Charlie and Delta feel from an
equity standpoint if Baker were allowed to shoulder Able's tax cost?

Baker may not mind the resulting reduction in his own personal
consumption, but it is not hard to imagine that Charlie and Delta
might envy Able's higher consumption relative to their own. 55 Nor is

it unthinkable that Charlie and Delta's resentment might spur selfhelp efforts to achieve Able's level of consumption. Hence, an
equitable tax code should assign nontransferable burdens and benefits

to taxpayers on the basis of their own particular economic benefits
(positive income or increased consumption) or burdens (negative
income or decreased consumption).
Two doctrines of individual income taxation serve to enforce the
notion that tax benefits and burdens correspond, or should
correspond, to an individual's particular economic burdens and
benefits. The constructive receipt doctrine5 6 is most often thought of
as a method to ensure the proper timing of income. 7 The doctrine
also ensures that tax burdens are assigned to the individual who
actually enjoys an accession to wealth. When an employee's monthly
wages are deposited in her checking account, the tax burden is
Ultimately the assertion cannot be proven even if it is intuitively appealing.
For a provocative discussion of fairness as it relates to tax policy, though, see Leo P.
Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution 31
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413 (2004).
55 There is an unsettled debate concerning the extent to which envy - "utility
interdependence" or "concern for relative position" - impacts tax efficiency.
Proponents asset that progressive taxation will not discourage work and innovation
because people will always judge the sufficiency of their consumption by comparing
their consumption to that of others. In essence, the desire to "keep up with the
Joneses" will counteract the disincentive to work harder caused by increased taxation.
Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 11, at 71-77 (summarizing the empirical research
regarding the effect of envy on optimal tax policy). In any event, envy is a product of
real or perceived inequity and we should expect that envy will manifest itself in
positive or negative self-help. In the text hypothesis, Charlie aid Delta can either
work harder or find ways to pay fewer taxes.
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1979).
57 "The doctrine of constructive receipt was, no doubt, conceived
by the
Treasury in order to prevent a taxpayer from choosing the year in which to return
income merely by choosing the year in which to reduce it to possession." Horning v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428, 434 (1967).
54
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imposed on the employee not the banking agent, precisely because it
is the employee who receives the economic benefit (consumption
potential). 18 The assignment of income doctrine is most often utilized
to thwart efforts to mitigate progressively higher rates by individuals
who nevertheless obtain or retain the economic benefit to which the
higher rates apply.5 9 The assignment of income doctrine, though,
would have relevance even in a world of single rate taxes. The ability
to increase personal consumption by shifting tax burdens to those who
are indifferent to decreases in their own personal consumption
(resulting from the higher tax burden) would likely engender
resentment amongst those without the same opportunity. These two
doctrines therefore confirm the notion that tax benefits and burdens
are, and should be, personal and nontransferable.
We might conclude from the foregoing that individuals who
realize economic benefits and burdens in their capacity as partners
should be subject to identical constraints regarding transferability of
tax liability. Partners should experience tax benefits or burdens in
precisely the same way as individuals unless there is something about
the partnership context that should change the matter. 60 The proof
that Congress intended that partners be treated like individuals is
strong, though not absolute. In fact, even if the ideal is that partner
tax liability is no more transferable than individual tax liability we
would still be faced with the objective reality that partners have far
greater opportunities to successfully transfer tax liabilities than
individuals. This point is demonstrated in Part III. The remaining
discussion in this Part concerns the extent, if any, to which Congress
has intentionally relaxed constraints on tax transferability with respect
to partners. Though the conclusion seems obvious, the question is
worthy of at least brief discussion, given the amount of tax liability
transfer that may actually occur in the partnership setting and the one
nagging but significant piece of evidence to the contrary discussed
58 Treas. Reg.

§ 1.451-2 (1979); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4) (2002)
(relating to the circumstances under which receipt by an agent will be deemed receipt
by the principal, for purposes of like-kind exchanges).
59 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). "The true nature of the assignment
of
income doctrine is simply this: it is a remedial doctrine designed to prevent high
income taxpayers from fragmenting their taxable income among related and lower
income taxpayers thereby undermining the graduated nature of the income tax
system." Ronald H. Jensen, Schneer v. Commissioner: Continuing Confusion over the
Assignment of Income Doctrine and Personal Service Income, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 623,
627 (1993).
60 See Rudnick, supra note 21, at 254-57 (regarding the efficiency gains by
granting nonrecognition to partners who pool their resources).
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below.
It is not entirely inconceivable that Congress might have intended
subchapter K as a wholly different tax system than that applicable to
individuals. Subchapters C and J, for example, do not simply create
mechanisms by which to trace income through a recognized entity to
individuals who receive or shoulder the economic benefits or burdens
derived through the entity. Those subchapters were actually intended
as different tax systems. That subchapter S establishes an election
whereby subchapter C corporation owners are taxed like individuals
only when the election is made proves that subchapter C imposes
something
on stockholders than that imposed on
•• •
61 different
individuals. Hence, realization concepts applicable to individuals are
intentionally and necessarily altered in subchapters C and J so that we
need not be concerned with or determine on whose behalf a C
corporation, an estate, or trust incurs positive or negative income.
Congress could have determined that the taxation of partners should
be governed by concerns different from those applicable to individuals
when they are not acting as partners.
There might also be a middle ground. That is, Congress might not
have intended that positive and negative income in subchapter K be
entirely decoupled from the individual who receives the
corresponding economic benefit or shoulders the economic burden,
but it might have specifically intended to relax the association.
Subchapter K could be viewed as an intentionally different tax system
than the system applicable to individuals, though the difference might
not be as pronounced as the differences between individual and
corporate or trust taxation.
Most evidence, if measured by reference to the volume of
statutory and regulatory verbiage, contradicts the notion that
Congress intended partners to be taxed differently, whether in small
or large measure. When, for example, it appeared that partners were
gaining wholesale tax advantages relative to individuals, subchapter K
was amended in apparent attempt to restore at least a semblance of
neutrality as between partners and individuals."2 In a generic sense,
the advantages to which the "anti-abuse" regulations refer have to do
63
with partners obtaining tax advantages vis-A-vis individuals. When
61 I.R.C. § 1362 (providing for the subchapter S election).
62

See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995) (containing the "partnership anti-abuse

regulations").
63 As Alan Gunn explains:
The first and probably most important factor [under the partnership anti-
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abuse is found under those regulations the explicit remedy is

fashioned by reference to the tax outcome that would apply to
individuals not acting as partners. 64 The implication is that partners
should be taxed just like individuals. There are specific statutes in
subchapter K, such as sections 704(c)(2) and 751, that are designed to

ensure that partners experience the same tax result as is imposed on
individuals.65 The single suggestion to the contrary, if it be even that,
relates to efficiency. The anti-abuse regulations convey an intention
to equate partners and individuals while at the same time conceding

that partners may sometimes be treated differently for reasons of
administrative convenience. 66 Here, the implication is that only when

transaction costs greatly overburden the accomplishment of an
efficiency goal should the rules of individual taxation be relaxed with

abuse regulations] calls for a comparison of the tax results under
subchapter K with those that would have obtained had the partners owned
the partnership's assets and conducted its activities directly. An American
Law Institute study once observed that, subject to the needs of
administrative convenience, "the ideal mode for taxing partnership
earnings is to tax each partner as though he were directly conducting his
proportionate share of partnership business." While there will be cases in
which practical considerations make it impossible to achieve this goal, an
interpretation of subchapter K that allows parties much more favorable tax
results than they could have obtained as individuals should be avoided
unless compelled by the language and purposes of the particular Code
section in question.
Alan Gunn, Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters: The
Use and Misuse of Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse
Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159,166 (2001).
64 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b)(1) (1995) (allowing the government to treat
purported partners as though they were individuals); id. § 1.701-2(e) (1995) (same).
65 Section 704(c)(2) is entitled, "Special rule for distributions where gain or loss
would not be recognized outside partnerships" and is designed to preclude "mixing
bowl" transactions by which partners previously could engage in explicit nontaxable
property exchanges. I.R.C. § 704(c)(2). The statute requires partners to recognize
the exact amount of gain individuals would recognize if they engaged in non-like-kind
exchanges of property. Laura E. Cunningham & Noel B. Cunningham, Simplifying
Subchapter K: The Deferred Sale Method, 51 SMU L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1997).
Section 751 treats a partner who sells her partnership interest in the same manner as
an individual would be treated if she sold her proportionate share of the partnership's
assets. I.R.C. § 751.
66 "Certain provisions of subchapter K and the regulations thereunder were
adopted to promote administrative convenience and other policy objectives, with the
recognition that the application of those provisions to a transaction could, in some
circumstances, produce tax results that do not properly reflect income." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.701-2(a)(3) (1995).
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regard to partners. As with the first point - that partners should be
taxed like individuals - there are statutory provisions to support the
notion that neutrality between individuals and partners is sometimes

intentionally relaxed.

Sections 704(c), 734, and 743 are primary

examples of provisions that tolerate an advantage to partners solely
67
Even those provisions, though, are
on the basis of efficiency.
calibrated such that the advantage allowed partners is only as much as
is necessary to eliminate the efficiency loss. Recent amendments
suggest that the tolerance for tax advantages granted to partners for
The
administrative reasons has decreased rather significantly. 8
conclusion, then, is that Congress intends partners to be taxed as
individuals except and only to the extent that taxing partners as such
would be greatly inefficient. It might even be safe to say that
Congress has grown quite skeptical of the inefficiency rationale as a
basis for making distinctions between partners and individuals.
Indeed, the relaxation of individual tax rules for efficiency or
"administrative burden" reasons could be viewed as merely
67

I.R.C. § 704(c)(1) relates to the allocation of partnership items derived from

built-in gain or loss property. Regulations under that provision allow but do not
require a partnership to use a tax accounting method that would eliminate tax
distortions caused by the "ceiling rule." See generally Darryll K. Jones, THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, 116-21 (West 2005); Cunningham, supra
note 14. The ceiling rule is discussed below. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying
text. I.R.C. §§ 734 and 743 are optional provisions that allow a partnership to adjust
the basis of retained or distributed property, respectively, to prevent distortions
caused by the partnership basis rules. If the optional methods of each provision are
elected partners would incur the exact tax liability that individuals would incur if the
individuals owned the partnership's assets outside of the partnership:
The principal purpose of the basis adjustment provided by § 743(b) when a
partnership interest is transferred by sale or exchange or upon death is to
put the transferee in the position he would have been in had he acquired a
The § 734(b) adjustments have the
direct interest in the partnership ....
same purpose as the basis adjustments provided by § 743(b).
ALl PROJECT, supra note 32, at 188, 191-92. Congress did not mandate the most
accurate methods in all cases because it believed doing so would impose an undue
administrative burden on some partnerships. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, at 70 (1954)
(regarding the elective provisions under I.R.C. §§ 734 and 743); ALl PROJECT, supra
note 32, at 195.
68 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 amended I.R.C. §§ 704 and 743 to,
inter alia, require basis adjustments under certain circumstances that previously
generated an optional basis adjustment. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 833, 118 Stat. 1418
(2004). In addition, the regulations under I.R.C. § 704(c) express a limitation on the
extent to which partners may use optional provisions for purely tax distortion
purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10) (2005).
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buttressing the notion that subchapter K is not intended as a different
system of taxation the way subchapter C or J might be viewed.
Fundamental tax principles relating to accessions to wealth are
relaxed even with regard to individuals when administrative burdens
make a sooner or more accurate collection of tax inefficient. 69 That
administrative convenience or efficiency sometimes alters the measure
of income in subchapter K perhaps merely proves that the same
considerations apply to both partners and individuals, though
naturally there may be different results owing to different
administrative burdens.
The foregoing conclusion would be indisputable but for one
seemingly innocuous sounding sentence in the I.R.C. § 704(b)
regulations. The sentence articulates the "ceiling rule" and states:
"the total income, gain, loss, or deduction allocated to the partners for
a taxable year with respect to a property cannot exceed the total
partnership income, gain, loss, or deduction with respect to that
property for the taxable year., 70 In short, the ceiling rule allows
partners to report income later than would an individual in
circumstances identical to those pertaining to a partner except for the
existence of the partnership. 71 The converse is also true. The ceiling
rule sometimes requires a partner to claim a deduction later than
would an individual. In certain cases, a partner's accession to wealth,
negative or positive, may be equal to an individual's and yet the
partner will report more or less income than that individual if the
partnership's method of accounting creates a difference between the
partner's accession to wealth and the partnership's accession to
72
wealth . The ceiling rule fundamentally alters individual concepts of
The best example of this is the realization doctrine. The realization doctrine
recognizes that it would be administratively burdensome to require taxpayers to value
their assets each year and then pay a tax on any increase in value from a prior year.
As a result, taxpayers do not report the increase in the value of property until a sale
or exchange occurs that alleviates the valuation burden and provides the taxpayer
with the liquidity by which to pay the resulting tax. See generally Daniel N. Shaviro,
An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal
Income Tax, 48 TAx L. REV. 1 (1992); Terrence R. Chorvat, Perception and Income:
The Behavioral Economics of the Realization Doctrine, 36 CONN. L. REV. 75, 76-77
(2003) ("While it is generally thought that the realization doctrine is both inefficient
and inequitable, the realization doctrine is sometimes accepted as an accommodation
to practical considerations.") (footnotes omitted).
70 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(1) (2005).
71 Cunningham, supra note
14, at 101-12.
7
Id. In Example 2, Treasury Regulation 1.704-3(d)(7), the application of the
ceiling rule results in partner E being $5,500 richer as a result of a partnership
69
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income, particularly to the extent income is infused with notions of
timing and the time value of money.
The rule is "seemingly innocuous" because its implications go
beyond the oft-cited notion that whatever differences between partner
and individual taxation created by the ceiling rule are merely
temporary. The differences are temporary only if we ignore the time
value of money. The partners whose income or deduction is deferred
will invariably report more positive or negative income when the
partnership liquidates but liquidation is not likely to occur until some
years later.73 Even if the distortion were only temporary, the ceiling
rule would still stand for the proposition that partners' income is
derivative rather than personal, as with individuals; that partnerships,
like corporations and trusts, really do have income, and that partners
This is a
can have no more income than their partnership.
fundamental statement similar to that pertaining to corporations or
trusts.
The ceiling rule therefore suggests a substantive difference
between partners and individuals that might justify different tax
outcomes. The suggestion is contradicted by the evidence previously
recounted but it exists nevertheless. We might conclude that the issue
is unresolved except that it seems clear that the ceiling rule owes its
existence solely to matters of efficiency - the relief of administrative
burden - rather than an attempt to make a substantive distinction
between partners and individuals. In fact, the ceiling rule seems
mostly to be a relic of the days when partners were inadvertently
subject to a wholly different taxing system.
When Congress
discovered the implications of the ceiling rule - that it created
differences between partners and individuals - it enacted provisions
to eliminate those differences but made those provisions elective in an
effort to relieve any administrative accounting burdens that might
result from a requirement that partners be taxed just like individuals.74
Here it should be noted that Congress has not given sufficient
thought to the issue with respect to the ceiling rule or any other
elective provision designed to eliminate differences between partners
and individuals. If it ever does so, one hopes it will explicitly conclude
that the elective provisions should instead be the norm and the
distortions arising from the perceived need to eliminate administrative
transaction in which the partnership realized only $5,000. Thus, the partner
recognized only $5,000 under the ceiling rule, but $5,500 under an optional corrective
provision. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(7) (2005).
73 Cunningham, supra note 14, at 102-04.
74 Id.
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burden should represent the exception. That is, the explicit norm
ought to be that partners be taxed just as individuals, with efficiency
related distortions being tolerated only in rare instances when an
administrative burden is demonstrably rather than presumptively too
great.75 As discussed in Part IV, present law is too often posited in the
extreme reverse: partners are normally taxed differently than
individuals, owing to the substantial economic effect test and optional
provisions within subchapter K, except when there is absolutely no
demonstrable efficiency reason.
The ultimate issue, then, is twofold whether with regard to
partners or individuals. At what point does the administrative
difficulty of accurately measuring income earned via partnerships and
then collecting the tax from the proper person create too much
inefficiency? This article asserts that the present bar is set way too
low. In any event, once that point is passed, how much inaccuracy
(i.e. inequity) should be tolerated in order that participants will not
abandon the otherwise efficient joint economic activity? In this
regard, this article asserts that the present bar is set way too high.
What is the best method to eliminate the intolerable administrative
burden without creating or encouraging very high inequitable results
as between partners and individuals? If, indeed, there is some level of
administrative difficulty that is tolerable in the sense that efficiency is
not entirely sacrificed, we are left with the task of fashioning the
mechanism that precisely imposes only that level of difficulty. The
substantial economic effect test eliminates all administrative burdens
when perhaps some burdens ought to be maintained so that equity is
preserved. Part IV seeks the mechanism that will, admittedly, restore
an administrative burden for the sake of equity but not so much that
efficiency is entirely sacrificed. The next section, though, identifies
the equity losses and efficiency gains under the substantial economic
effect test. The earliest attempt at taxing partners simply ignored any
potential for inequity and directed partners to assume their accurate
75 The enactment of statutory mandates with regard to previously elective

provisions is an indication that Congress is moving, however slowly, towards this
result. See supra note 68 (regarding recent changes requiring basis adjustments that
were previously optional where the failure to make an election caused partners' tax
liability to be different from what it would be if the partners' were taxed as
individuals). Regulatory anti-abuse provisions also suggest that equality of result as
between partners and individuals should more often be the norm rather than an
optional exception. See Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(d), ex. 8 (2005) (regarding the failure to
make an I.R.C. § 754 election resulting in a partner obtaining a loss deduction for
which no economic expenditure is made); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10) (2005). The
evidence is still too weak to discern a definite trend, however.
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share of the partnership's aggregate tax benefits and burdens.
Partners were left to their own devices and naturally preferred tax
reduction (i.e., individual efficiency) over equity. The disequilibrium
between equity and efficiency arising under those circumstances
prompted Congress to adopt the substantial economic effect safe
harbor." In theory at least, substantial economic effect should ensure
that special allocations always result in sufficient efficiency gains to
offset equity losses. This is not the case, particularly when the
substantial economic effect safe harbor applies in conjunction with
other provisions made optional because of an alleged administrative
burden. In adopting substantial economic effect, rather than a more
precise mechanism, Congress implicitly concluded that accurately
measuring each partner's income is too difficult and that the
inaccuracies of the substantial economic effect safe harbor are
tolerable given the efficiency gains that would be lost under a
mandate to be precise. Part III analyzes the second of these
determinations and determines it to be false. Part IV proposes a
standard that would more accurately measure each partner's income
without sacrificing efficiency or equity.
III. EFFICIENCY GAINS AND EQUITY LOSSES OF SUBSTANTIAL
ECONOMIC EFFECT

A partnership, of course, cannot have positive or negative
income. Income, in the Haig-Simons sense, refers to the satisfaction
78
of human desires and there is nothing human about a partnership.
The income, positive or negative, measured at the partnership level is
merely the income of one or more human partners. Though not
personified, the partnership may itself determine the partner on
whose behalf it receives or spends income. Left to its own devices, as
it is under current law, the partnership will make a determination that
76

Tariff Act of 1913, Section II G(a), ch. 16, 38 Stat. 172 (1913).

77 The earliest subchapter K version of I.R.C. § 704 did not explicitly reference

the substantial economic effect test as a test of allocations. Instead, the provision
prohibited allocations "the principal purpose" of which was "the avoidance of any
tax." I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1954). The phrase "substantial economic effect" was first
used in the legislative history of the original version of I.R.C. § 704(b) and
subsequently appeared in regulations under old I.R.C. § 704(b). Buchholz, supra note
14, at 171-73.
78 Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects,
in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 2 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921) ("Modern
economic analysis recognizes that fundamentally income is a flow of satisfactions, of
intangible psychological experiences.").
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results in the best tax outcome even if that determination is
inconsistent with economic reality. Thus, we should think of the
partnership as an unprincipled agent with several principals.7 ' The
partnership is unprincipled to the extent it can be used to assert that
an accession to wealth is being held for the account of one partner,
and thus taxed to that partner, when in fact the wealth will ultimately
inure to another. Put another way, the partnership may be used to
assert that one partner suffers negative income, and is thereafter
granted a deduction, from the payment of a partnership expense when
in fact the payment will be taken from another partner's account
maintained by the partnership. In this situation, economic benefits
and burdens are completely disassociated from tax burdens and
benefits. The partners' actual positive and negative income will have
nothing whatever in common with their separate tax liabilities.
Why is it, then, that partnerships - or more precisely partners are left to their own devices? The single, universally asserted
justification for the latitude given partners is the imperative need for
flexibility. 80 According to that mantra, the infinite variety of economic
arrangements between joint economic actors is to be encouraged and
an inflexible taxing rule would actually discourage beneficial joint
by foreclosing certain of those infinite
business activity apparently
S •
81
business relationships. That assertion relates to the decreased social
The Supreme Court conceives of the partnership as an agent, stating, "the
partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable entity apart from the
aggregate of its partners. Once its income is ascertained and reported, its existence
may be disregarded since each partner must pay a tax on a portion of the total income
as if the partnership were merely an agent or conduit through which the income
passed." United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 (1973).
80 The flexibility notion is asserted so often that one
should be surprised not to
find mention of it in any discussion of partnership tax. See infra note 81. It began,
apparently, with the 1954 adoption of subchapter K. Both the House and Senate
reports mentioned the need for flexibility prominently. S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 89
(1954); H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 65 (1954) (both reports stated that the intent of
subchapter K was to permit joint profit-making with "simplicity, flexibility, and equity
as between the partners."). The Treasury Department repeated the intent when it
introduced the anti-abuse regulations in Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2. Subchapter K AntiAbuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,581 (proposed May 17, 1994) ("Subchapter K was
enacted to permit businesses organized for joint profit to be conduced with
'simplicity, flexibility, and equity' as between partners.").
81 Berger, supra note 14, at 108; Buchholz, supra note 14, at 177 (referring to the
"broad latitude" that should be afforded partners); Cunningham, supra note 14, at
124; Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 14, at 1; Kwall, supra note 14, at
232; Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms, supra note 14, at 250; William J.
Rands, Passthrough Entities and their Unprincipled Differences under Federal Tax
79
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utility that would result if partners were subjected to greater
regulation in their division of tax benefits and burdens.
The
implication is that some level of beneficial joint business activity
would be foregone in the absence of the flexibility. 82 The assertion is
normally made as if it is entirely axiomatic, as if the truth of the
matter is so apparent that it should be accepted on faith. Yet just the
opposite is proven, or at least strongly suggested, by joint business
actors' continuing and growing preference for S corporations as the
83
means by which to pursue business profit.
S corporations are
subjected to a relatively inflexible taxing scheme. 84 Thus, joint
economic actors' preference for S corporations is either irrational, or
the assertion that flexibility is necessary with regard to when and how
Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 15, 19 (1997); Christine Rucinski Strong & Susan Pace Hamill,
Allocations Attributable to Partner Nonrecourse Liabilities:Issues Revealed by LLCs
and LLPs, 51 ALA. L. REV. 603, 606 (2000); Yin, supra note 19, at 155.
82 Schwidetzky, supra note 14, at 717-18 ("Any effort at significant simplification
that simultaneously avoids abuse would likely come at a high price. The rules would
have to be made more inflexible, and thus less useful to business conducted through a
partnership.").
83 As Lawrence Lokken explains:
Subchapter S is very popular. For 1999, the most recent year reported,
approximately 2.7 million corporations filed returns as S corporations. For
that year, the number of S corporation returns was more than 135 percent
of the number of partnership returns. These statistics may surprise some
observers, who see subchapter S as a relic of an earlier era. Limited
liability company laws protect members against personal liability for entity
debt much like corporation laws and are much more flexible than
corporation laws; moreover, an LLC and its members can enjoy the
permissiveness of subchapter K and not be burdened by the rigidities of
subchapter S. However, the 1999 statistics lend little support to the
common assumption that LLCs are well on the way to supplanting S
corporations. The number of S corporation returns in 1999 was 5.3 percent
larger than the number of 1998 returns, while the number of partnership
returns increased by 4.4 percent. Approximately 302,000 corporations first
elected S status for 1999, of which approximately 217,000 were newly
organized corporations. Newly organized S corporations thus exceeded ten
percent of the number of all partnerships, new and old. Vanishing relic,
indeed! Anecdotal evidence indicates that organizing a new venture as an
LLC, checking the box corporate, and electing subchapter S is a not
uncommon (if treacherous) practice.
Lawrence Lokken, As the World of PartnershipTaxation Turns, 56 SMU L. REV. 365,
367-68 (2003).
84 There are no eligibility requirements under subchapter K. See I.R.C. § 761(a).
By contrast, there are specific and detailed eligibility requirements under subchapter
S. See I.R.C. § 1361(b).
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partners ought to be taxed cannot withstand close scrutiny. In any
case, the assertion never references specific activities that could not be
undertaken efficiently if the partners were required to assume the tax
benefits and burdens strictly in accordance with their relative capital.
The failure to provide concrete reference makes the assertion difficult
to disprove other than by equally vague denials. Setting aside the
demonstrated preference for S corporations, one can therefore only
accept or reject on faith the assertion that denying partners flexibility
with respect to their tax liability is an inefficient thing to do.
The growing preference for S corporations is not conclusive,
though, if one assumes that joint economic actors who require
flexibility would simply not join together in the absence of subchapter
K as it is presently configured. Joint actors who utilize the S
corporation form might simply be remnants of the entire population
of would-be joint economic actors, the others having forsaken the
activity because of a lack of flexibility. As a policy matter, we are
therefore obliged to anticipate and imagine those joint activities that
contribute to social utility but which would not be undertaken in the
absence of flexibility. This seems an impossible task and perhaps
forces the acceptance of the substantial economic effect test as a
matter of caution.
Other scholars, fortunately, have attempted to define a
representative body of transactions that might be foregone in the
absence of flexibility. 8 There is a consensus that special allocations
are useful because they allow partners to order their relationships in a
manner that replicates sale-leasebacks, asset exchanges, borrowing, or
profit-sharing salary plans. 86 The first transaction is illegitimate from a
87
tax standpoint. It should not be accommodated whether undertaken
within or without a partnership because sale-leasebacks merely distort
economic decisions by allowing one party to sell tax benefits to
another. 88 The other three can be accommodated without the equity
losses occasioned by special allocations. This article does not attempt
to belabor the point by imagining even more sophisticated
transactions, or even relating with any great detail the examples
already provided.
The article relates the general parameters,

Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 14, at 1, 4, 19-28 (regarding safe
harbor leases and asset exchanges) Lokken. supra note 14, at 257-71 (regarding
loans); Schwidetzky, supra note 14, at 716-26 (regarding profit-sharing plans).
86 See infra note
84.
87 Gergen, Reforming SubchapterK, supra note 14,
at 21.
85

88

Id.
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primarily in footnotes,89 solely to prove that the real utility of joint
economic activity, properly conceived, would not be affected if
partners enjoyed less flexibility and were required to accurately report

their income.
Professor Gergen's early work posits "spatial" and "temporal"
transactions.9 Spatial allocations involve allocating all tax items from
one partnership asset to one partner and all items from another asset
to another partner. 9' In effect, the partners have merely divided up

the partnership's assets and their associated economic benefits and
89 I prefer to describe the examples in footnotes so as not to unduly interrupt
or

belabor the text discussion.
For example, Gergen asserts that the following
allocations duplicate a sale-leaseback:
ABC is considering an investment of $1,000 to develop a mine which will
produce $160 income per year for nine years. ABC has sufficient net
operating losses carried over from prior years so that it will not pay taxes
for many years. ABC enters into a partnership with DEF, which has a 40%
marginal rate, to develop the mine. ABC contributes $850 and DEF
contributes $150. Under the partnership agreement, 100% of the mine
development expense is allocated to DEF and 100% of the income is
allocated to DEF until its capital account is restored to zero. Thereafter,
80% of the income is allocated to ABC and 20% is allocated to DEF. So
long as DEF has a negative capital account balance, available cash is
distributed to ABC.
Assuming the prevailing interest rate is 10%, ABC would choose not to
invest $1,000 in developing the mine since the rate of return is only 8%. In
[this example], ABC sells the tax benefits of the expenditure, which are of
no value to it, to DEF. The resulting investment should be attractive to
both ABC and DEF. Assuming the projections are accurate, this
investment has a positive net present value for ABC at a 10% interest rate
and for DEF at a 6% interest rate. That is, each does better than it would
investing its capital at the normal pretax 10% rate of return.
[This example] is similar to a safe-harbor lease. DEF's capital contribution
takes the place of the down payment. DEFs 20% residual interest takes the
place of the option price at the end of the lease. DEF has the benefit of the
losses, and the income allocated to DEF under the income chargeback to
return its capital account to zero is similar to the income the lessor would
have under a safe-harbor lease from rents used to service the debt that are
not offset by the interest deduction on the note. Just like rents used to pay
principal, the income on the chargeback merely offsets the earlier
depreciation deductions and provides DEF no economic benefit.
Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 14, at 21-22 (citations omitted).
90 Id. at 34-40.
91

Id. at 34-35.
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burdens amongst themselves.92 If the properties were contributed by
partners other than those to whom items from the properties are
allocated, the partners will have effectuated an implicit, untaxed
exchange because in an economic sense, the one who owns the yield
owns the property. 93 The allocation would be respected, more often
than not, under the substantial economic effect test. Gergen's second
generic classification involves "temporal" allocations.94 These involve
allocations from one asset to one partner for a period of time followed
by allocations from that same asset to another partner. Here the
partners have implicitly bought and sold divisible interests in a single
asset.95 They will have achieved something that could not be achieved
tax free outside of the partnership context.
In a later article, Professor Lokken describes property exchanges
as well as transactions that should most accurately be described as
loans. 96 One of Lokken's examples proves that a special allocation
designed to effectuate a preferred return to one partner is
economically identical to a loan between two individuals acting
outside of the partnership context. 97 Gergen and Lokken therefore
make the point that the transactions, about which they imagine the
need for flexibility is asserted, can be achieved in other ways and
indeed with as much or more efficiency than through special
allocations. To deny partners the flexibility they presently enjoy
should therefore not artificially prevent beneficial transactions since
those transactions can be accomplished in other efficient ways and
with greater assurance that the same tax imposed on individuals will
be imposed on partners.
The examples probably disprove the need for flexibility to a
greater extent than even Gergen and Lokken might have anticipated.
Id.
I do not mean to suggest that the concept of "property" or "ownership"
can
be so easily summarized for all purposes. In fact, the opposite is true. See Adam
Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371
(2003) (describing the philosophical theories that attempt to explain and exemplify
the legal concept of "property"). For tax purposes, though, property ownership can
be described as simply as stated in the text. Rights to yield from property connotes
ownership which, in turn, determines the proper taxpayer. See Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940). See generally David S. Miller, Taxpayers' Ability to Avoid Tax
Ownership: Current Law and Future Prospects, 51 TAx LAw. 279, 281-90 (1998)
(regarding the tax benefits and burdens triggered by property ownership).
94 Gergen, Reforming SubchapterK, supra note
14, at 34, 36.
95 See id.
96 Lokken, supra note
14, at 256-58.
92

93

97

Id.

2006]

Equity and Efficiency in PartnershipAllocations

1083

Flexibility, it should be remembered, is justified by anticipated utility

gains derived from joint economic activity. Cooperative strivings can
add to total utility because cooperative efforts allow investors with
differing risk tolerances to share risks they would otherwise avoid if
they had to shoulder those risks individually.98 This is the law and
economics rationale underlying state laws regarding partnerships and

other non-corporate forms of joint economic activity. 99 Those laws are
98

Professor Rudnick provides a nice summary of the economic literature

regarding the efficiency gains from risk sharing:
Risk-sharing is economically efficient; the tax system ought to allow risksharing consistent with tax policy equity goals to the fullest extent possible.
As discussed earlier, persons with diverse attributes are likely to join
together for risk- and reward-bearing, and the contribution and special
allocation rules in Subchapter K accommodate this difference.
Partnership formation and continuation is an exercise in risk-sharing among
persons, economically classified as "syndicates," with various risk aversions.
Early group risk-sharing models posited homogenous attitudes towards risk
and found that pro rata sharing agreements were optimal. Complex sharing
arrangements reflecting heterogeneous beliefs about risk produce more
efficient outcomes, although one study treats equal sharing as the only way
to exercise control over bargaining in a joint venture under asymmetric
information even when participants contribute unequal amounts. Other
models of individual bargaining find that equal sharing is inefficient
because people can only exploit economies by sharing with less able people
and cannot achieve size without heterogeneity. Thus, the partnership entity
value is greater than that of a sole proprietorship in many contexts. If
individuals know and have various views of their risk aversion, they should
receive greater latitude in selecting capital structure and profit and loss
sharing.
Rudnick, supra note 21, at 299-302 (citations omitted).
99 Id. at 254-57. Professor Ribstein elegantly describes the
role that laws should
have in the regulation of partnerships:
Partnership law itself is now nonuniform across U.S. jurisdictions. More
importantly, the partnership form itself has split into subforms, including
the limited liability company (LLC) and the limited liability partnership
(LLP), that provide a continuous spectrum of forms.
This recent history in the United States holds important lessons for Europe
as it embarks on partnership law reform. A single set of business
association rules issued by a central planner cannot meet the needs of
various types of firms or respond to firms' changing business needs. Central
planning is hostage both to inherent limits on human knowledge and
foresight and to interest group politics. Rather, firms should be able to pick
suitable rules by making both "horizontal" choices among the various

1084

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:1047

derived from the notion that enforcement of the flexible, fiduciary
relationship between partners increases utility. It is better that laws
encourage rather than discourage the mutual risk sharing that
characterizes partnerships. Thus, it is axiomatic that tax laws should
not inhibit this process. Flexibility should be condoned provided it
does not sacrifice other goals. Gergen and Lokken's examples,
though, are different from the partnership process that is to be
encouraged. Their examples, presumed representative of the universe
of transactions with regard to which the flexibility mantra is asserted,
do not involve the mutual striving - "the all for one and one for all"
- ideal from which increased utility is derived. The transactions
described by Gergen and Lokken are mere variations of the oppositeend bargaining that occurs between buyers and sellers. Those
transactions do not involve the classic, mutual striving or risk sharing
characteristic of classic partnerships and from which particular social
utility is derived. Increased utility may well result, but it is the same
sort that results when individuals with adverse interest bargain at arms
length outside the partnership context. Nothing is added to aggregate
social utility that could not be achieved outside the partnership
context. The transactions are beneficial, no doubt, but the partnership
is merely background scenery. Hence, the tax laws pertaining to those
transactions need not be any more flexible than those applicable to
individuals outside of the partnership context. There is no reason to
provide greater flexibility with regard to tax burdens and benefits
merely because opposite-end bargaining occurs within the partnership
context.
Even if it could be shown that the flexibility granted to partners
was efficient and resulted in utility gains, we would still be obliged to
juxtapose those gains with whatever equity losses result from the
flexibility. Equity losses are, of course, implicit in any decision to tax
persons with identical income differently unless efficiency gains

jurisdictions and "vertical" choices among business forms available within
jurisdictions. Moreover, more efficient rules can emerge from jurisdictional
competition for business formations, and from an evolutionary process in
which more efficient forms become more prevalent and less efficient forms
fall into disuse. The primary engine of efficiency is the parties' ability to
contract for the applicable law, including selection of a firm's internal
governance rules through choice of the state of organization. There is
significant evidence that permitting horizontal and vertical choice of
business forms produces efficient outcomes.
Larry Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership,26 J. CORP. L. 819, 820-21 (2001) (citations
omitted).
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compensate the disadvantaged taxpayer.'00 The matter could be left at
that because this article has shown that there are no utility gains from
partnerships that could not be obtained in the absence of flexibility.
There is at least one scholarly assertion, though, that the equity losses
occasioned by the flexibility given to partners is both efficient and
results in no equity losses. In his 1998 article, Professor Walter
Schwidetzky gives two examples of transactions that are benefited by
flexibility in the regulation of partners' tax liabilities. His first
example is that of a partnership in which partners differ in how active
a role they desire in the business. Schwidetzky notes that under a
flexible system, the partners "can amend the voting rights and
allocations of income can be adjusted to take this change into account,
all without generating a taxable transaction."' 0 '
Schwidetzky further argues that in the absence of flexibility,
partners might haveS to
engage in taxable transactions to achieve their
• 102
governance objectives.
This appears to be a rather classic non
sequitur. It is not apparent why partners must be granted broad
flexibility with respect to their tax liabilities as a means to effectuate
their level of involvement in the partnership. State law flexibility that
partnerships already enjoy allows partners to reallocate voting and
governance rights as they see fit. That state law flexibility is
complemented by an established and concise body of tax law, wholly
unrelated to the division of tax benefits and burdens, holding that
changes in partnership participation rights can be made quite easily
without incurring a tax liability.0 3 The division of tax benefits and
burdens has nothing to do with levels of participation so any tax
advantages provided to partners vis-A-vis individuals on that logic is,
by definition, inequitable.
Schwidetzky's second example makes better sense and, as he
notes, is conceded even by others who object to the substantial
economic effect test. In the stereotypical "money and brains"
partnership one partner contributes all or most of the capital, while
100See supra note 9.
101Schwidetzky, supra note 14, at 724.
102 See id.
...See Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157 (regarding the tax-free conversion of a
general partnership interest to a limited partnership interest); Rev. Rul. 95-37, 1995-1
C.B. 130 (regarding the tax-free conversion of a partnership to a limited liability
company); Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434 (regarding taxable and tax-free conversion
of a single member LLC to a partnership); Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c)-(d) (2005)
(regarding the taxable and tax-free methods of achieving partnership mergers and
divisions).
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4
another contributes all or most of the labor and expertise.'0
Schwidetzky notes, quite correctly, that requiring partners to allocate
partnership items strictly in accordance with contributed capital would
deprive the brains partner of the ability to share in the partnership's
profits. In effect, such a rule would relegate the brains partner to the
status of employee. Hence, inflexibility would discourage money and
brains partnerships. Schwidetzky acknowledges the obvious point,
that there are myriad ways by which employees can be compensated
by a profit share and even by methods that lead to the conversion of
the employee to an owner.
He dismisses those alternative methods
too easily with the claim that they would be "complex. ' 6 That profit
and employee ownership plans have become ubiquitous is sufficient to
belie the complexity claim at least in comparison to the complexity
provoked by special allocations designed to achieve the same result.
The money and brains partnership, though, is useful to show the
equity loss caused by the substantial economic effect test. It is
understandable that the money partner would agree to share the
profits equally or on some other basis disproportionate to her relative
capital contribution. Doing so would not be problematic in a tax
system that made no distinctions between types of income because
some of the profit will be attributable to the brain partner's expertise
and that partner must necessarily pay taxes on her share of the profit.
In a system that distinguishes between income from capital and
income from labor, with the former being taxed at lower rates,
allocations to the service partner create opportunities for inequity as
between service partners and individual laborers. The individual
laborer will, of course, report her compensation as ordinary income
and be subjected to the highest tax rates. A brains partner, though,
could be allocated a share of the partnership's capital gain as
compensation and thereafter be taxed at lower rates than the
individual ••in107identical circumstances except for the existence of a
partnership.
This is an unnecessary inequity, given the available
alternative for sharing profits and ownership between the two

104

Schwidetzky, supra note 14, at 724-25. Schwidetzky does not mention options

by which an employee would be given the right to purchase ownership shares but that
too would solve the problem he identifies.
105Id.
106

Id.

107See Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191 (regarding the treatment of a service

provider as a partner to whom allocations of income characterized at the partnership
level may be made).
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participants.0 8
Schwidetzky argues, in opposition to the equity loss notion, that
the substantial economic effect safe harbor thwarts most tax
avoidance schemes."" His analysis, though, defines equity losses
solely by reference to whether subsequent tax reductions result from
special allocations and is therefore too narrow. This definition ignores
the economic reality that special allocations effectuate tax-free
property exchanges."" The inequity occurs at the moment partners
are allowed to engage in tax-free exchanges - exchanges that
individuals could not engage in tax free - regardless of subsequent
tax outcomes resulting from allocations of items from the exchanged
properties. An overview of the substantial economic effect test helps
clarify this rejoinder.
Under present law, all allocations - capital account or special must comply with the substantial economic effect safe harbor or be
consistent with the partners' interest in the partnership.
The
substantial economic effect safe harbor has the advantage of certainty.
The PIP test is extremely uncertain. Economic actors value certainty
of results and therefore prefer the substantial economic effect safe
harbor. The safe harbor is met if allocations have "economic effect"
which is "substantial.'' Achieving economic effect requires only that
the partnership follow certain accounting rules. First, the partnership
must maintain separate "capital accounts" for each partner using rules
similar to those applied to simple checking or savings accounts capital accounts must be credited with deposits and debited with
withdrawals."'
Second, upon liquidation of the partnership or a
partner's interest in the partnership, the partnership must distribute to
each partner her capital account balance. 13 Third, each partner must
repay to the partnership any overdraft in her capital account."' These
requirements, which must be imposed by provisions in the partnership
agreement, are quite easily complied with.
The second part of the substantial economic effect test requires
that allocations be "substantial.1 . 5 The substantiality requirement is
108
109

See generally I.R.C. §§ 412-423.
Schwidetzky, supra note 14, at 718 (asserting that the vast majority of abusive

transactions do not survive scrutiny under the substantial economic effect test).
110 See Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 14, at 34-38.
...Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(i) (2005).
"2 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii), (iv).
113 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2).
114 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3).
"' Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii).
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designed to prevent purely tax driven allocations while not impeding
allocations dictated by economic circumstances. Implicit in this goal is
the necessity to determine human motivations. The substantiality test
uses undefined probabilities to ascertain motivations. The overall rule
is that allocations will be substantial if there is a "reasonable
possibility" that allocations will affect dollar amounts that each
partner will 116
receive from the partnership independent of tax
consequences.
The meaning of this rule is obscured by the fact that
it is stated without explicit reference to any particular starting point.
Without knowing a partner's baseline economic take, it is impossible
to know whether an allocation will have the required effect. The most
likely starting point, though, is one based on capital account
allocations because that is the explicit, presumptive baseline when
allocations violate the substantial economic effect test."' Thus, the tax
and economic effect of special allocations should be compared to the
tax and economic effect of capital account allocations.
Note that the substantiality test requires a showing of "reasonable
possibility," though that phrase is not defined. The general rule, such
as it is, is implemented via two relatively more specific benchmarks. If
(1) an allocation may reduce at least one partner's taxes and (2) there
is a strong likelihood that the allocation will not substantially diminish
any partner's economic yield •or118"m
take from the partnership,
y the
allocation will not be substantial.
The probabilities - "may" and
"strong likelihood" - must exist at the time the allocations are agreed
upon but can be proven on a prospective or a five year retrospective
basis." 9 That is, if there are facts known prior to the allocations that
allow the partners to think that one partner's taxes may be reduced
and there is a strong likelihood that no other partners will sacrifice
anything, the allocation will not be substantial. In addition, if it just
turns out that way within five years - one partner is benefited but no
partner is substantially worse off - the probability is presumed to
have existed on the day the allocations were adopted. ' ° That
presumption, though, can be overcome by looking at what could have
been known on the day the allocations were adopted. 21 Thus, an
See supra note 17 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(iv)(2)(iii) (2005)).
117 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i)
(2005) ("All partners' interests in the
partnership are presumed to be equal (determined on a per capita basis).").
118 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a).
116

"9 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c).
120 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(b)-(c) (containing
"look-back" rules for "shifting" and
"transitory" allocations).
1
Thus, the five year look-back rule shifts the burden of explanation to partners.
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allocation will be insubstantial only when there are sufficient facts
from which to foretell with any reasonable certainty that the only
impact of the allocation is a reduction in taxes. If the foretold
reduction in taxes is accompanied by a strong likelihood that no
partner's economic circumstances will change, the allocation will be
insubstantial.
Gergen and Schwidetzky disagree as to the level of tax avoidance
spawned by the substantiality test's focus on the ability to foretell the
future. Gergen's two most relevant examples are these:
Example 1: A and B each invests $50 in AB partnership. The
partnership expends and deducts $100 in year one. It expects
to earn $106 in year two. The entire $100 of loss in year one
and the first $100 of income in year two are allocated to A.
$6 income in year two is split evenly between
The remaining
122
B.
A and
Example 4: A and B are equal partners in AB partnership,
which owns taxable and tax-exempt bonds earning equal
amounts of total interest. A has a 40% marginal rate and B is
The interest on the tax-exempt bonds is
tax exempt.
allocated to A and the interest on the taxable bonds is
allocated to B.123
In Example 1, A defers $50 income by virtue of the special allocation.
If B had non-partnership losses in year 1 sufficient to offset whatever
gains he realized, we could expect him to accommodate A's desire for
more first year losses. The capital accounts, and thus each partner's
economic take from the partnerships, would not differ under these
allocations from what they would be if items were allocated in
The only
accordance with each partner's capital contribution.
tax
have
a
lower
aggregate
the
partners
would
difference is that
liability."' In Example 4, the partners' tax liability would decrease
while the capital accounts would remain identical to what they would
be in the absence of the allocation. B would be indifferent to the
Even so, this burden cannot be terribly difficult because the partners have the
greatest access to information.
122 Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K,
supra note 14, at 5, 8.
123 Id. at
124

8.

Assuming the facts exist to prove the requisite probabilities, these allocations

would be labeled "transitory" and would fail the substantiality requirement. Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c) (2005).
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interest to A would result
allocation and the allocation of tax-exempt
15
2
in one party having a lower tax burden.
Schwidetzky notes, quite correctly, that Gergen's income and gain
shifting allocations would very likely be prohibited under the
substantial economic effect test.16 The stipulated facts allow us to
conclude that one partner - A - will have a better after-tax result
because of the allocation and there is a strong likelihood that no
partner's economic circumstance will change for the worse. The
problem of course is that both examples stipulate the essential facts by
which to achieve the level of probability necessary to preclude the
allocations. The substantiality test is based on patently vague and
amorphous concepts such as "may," "strong likelihood," and
"substantial" differences."' It seems illogical to assume that partners
seeking illegitimate tax advantages could not build some minimal
amount of uncertainty, whatever that may be, into their transaction
and thereby achieve substantiality. In any event, Gergen's two
examples and Schwidetzky's response ignore the moral hazard
inherent to the substantiality test. It is not that partners must
explicitly lie regarding their expectations to achieve substantiality,
they need only create plausible uncertainty. This seems an easy task.
As a result, the potential equity losses pertaining to the substantial
economic effect test are high even under Schwidetzky's narrow
definition.
Even if that were not the case, it would be incomplete to consider
the substantial economic effect safe harbor in a vacuum. Most of the
recent and notorious tax avoidance wrought via subchapter K would
not be possible under the substantial economic effect safe harbor
alone, but the safe harbor is indispensable to those efforts. When
used in conjunction with the ceiling rule, for example, the substantial
economic effect test can result in significant deferral, as demonstrated
in the following hypothetical based on a recent case: 18 Heavy debt
laden Domestic partner contributes airplanes worth $540 million to a
partnership. The airplanes are fully depreciated and thus have an
inside basis of zero. They generate $100 million in annual rental
income and approximately $65 million in annual book depreciation.
The partnership also has approximately $25 million in other
If the requisite probabilities are shown in this instance, the allocations would
be labeled "shifting" and thus fail the substantiality requirement. Id. § 1.7041(b)(2)(iii)(b).
126 Schwidetzky, supra note 14,
at 720-21.
127 There are no cases defining these terms.
125

128

Castle Harbour v. Commissioner, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004).
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deductible expenses. Two Foreign partners contribute $112 million.
The partnership agreement allocates 98% of the income and expenses
to the Foreign partners and 2% to Domestic partner. Provisions are
also made to liquidate the Foreign partners' capital accounts by eight
annual distributions such that the Foreign partners will receive an
above market return on their capital investment. The partnership
elects to use the traditional method to make allocations with respect
to the airplanes.
The effect of the disproportionate allocation (relative to capital
investment) on book accounts is that the Foreign partners will be
allocated only about $9.8 million book income - the allocated book
income will be reduced by allocated book depreciation, leaving a net
of only $9.8 million. For tax purposes, however, the Foreign partners
will be allocated about $74 million because the ceiling rule will deny
an allocation of tax depreciation to correspond to the book
depreciation.9 If the partnership also makes annual distributions, it
can effectively buy out the Foreign partners' interests, leaving the
majority of the income originally assigned to the Foreign partners for
distribution to the Domestic partner. That this outcome - i.e., the
bulk of the income being stored for distribution to the Domestic
Partner - was always intended means that the income should have
been taxed to the Domestic partner at a much earlier point in time.
The partners could rectify the timing distortion by electing an optional
approach that would require the Domestic partner to recognize earlier
an amount equal to book depreciation and provide the Foreign
partners with offsetting tax depreciation equal to book depreciation."9
In the absence of that election, and in conjunction with the liquidating
distributions, the book income allocated to the Foreign partners will
actually inure to the Domestic partner's benefit, though not taxed to
the Domestic partner until the partnership liquidates. In short, the
special allocation coupled with the ceiling rule, allows the Domestic
partner to defer tax on large amounts of taxable income. This
outcome would not have been possible if income were allocated in
accordance with relative capital - 98% to the Domestic partner and
2% to the Foreign partners.
Some might argue that the just described transaction does not
represent an abuse or equity loss at all because the Domestic partner

19

130

Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(1)(2005).
See id. § 1.704-1(c)-(d) (describing the curative and remedial allocation

methods which, if elected, would require Domestic partner to recognize income
currently).
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could have achieved the same result by borrowing money from the

Foreign partners outside of the partnership context. The assertion
proves too much. If the transaction could have been achieved outside

the partnership, there is certainly no need to condone distortions
under subchapter K to facilitate the transaction within the partnership
context. That the Domestic partner used the partnership to create a
debtor-creditor relationship proves that it could not do so outside the
partnership. The transaction is a classic off-balance sheet financing
deal designed to thwart the market's decision not to provide the

Domestic partner with further debt financing. Indeed, the market
signals when debtors have too much debt or are otherwise not
creditworthy by denying further debt financing, usually by way of
debt-equity covenants or downgraded credit ratings."' This is an
efficient and useful process. Allowing debt laden borrowers to bypass
rational market limitations via the flexibility of subchapter K is

therefore inefficient on a macro level and, assuming the market was
correct with regard to the debtor's credit rating, should result in
decreased utility. In any event, the subchapter K flexibility in this fact
pattern provides an advantage to un-creditworthy partners that would
not be extended to individuals. This is a significant efficiency as well

as equity loss.
This section demonstrates two things. First, there is no efficiencybased reason to grant partners greater flexibility with respect to their
tax benefits and burdens than that granted to individuals. Doing so
131

Schwarcz explains the benefits and shortcomings of structured-finance

transactions as follows:
Structured-finance transactions that are used to raise money off-balancesheet are not inherently bad, and indeed can have important benefits, such
as better allocating risk with assets. However, they also can mask liabilities
that only first become evident when a company goes bankrupt. Say, for
example, a company is able to characterize a transaction as a sale with
contingent recourse, which otherwise (but less appropriately) would be
viewed as balance-sheet debt. In a sale transaction, the contingent recourse
only needs to be shown on the company's balance sheet if the contingency
is "probable."
Although diligent investors would learn of contingent
liabilities by reading the footnotes to the balance sheet - such liabilities
must be disclosed in those footnotes if the contingency is merely a
"reasonable possibility" - investors often focus exclusively on the balance
sheet itself without regard to risks disclosed in the footnotes. They
therefore often fail to anticipate that, in a bankruptcy, contingent recourse
may be asserted as a claim against the company.
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance,
84 TEx. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2005).
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might be conducive to partners' private utility but there is no
improvement to social utility since the transactions to which the
flexibility is applied are nothing more than the opposite end
bargaining that already occurs efficiently between unrelated parties.
To allow partners to accomplish what the market otherwise prohibits
decreases social utility assuming the market prohibits the result for
good and efficient reasons. Second, the flexibility of subchapter K
creates significant equity losses. In the first two examples above, the
substantial economic effect test allows a partner to obtain timing
advantages through untaxed exchanges of property. In the last
example, the substantial economic effect test helps a partner gain a
timing advantage by manipulating the constructive receipt and
assignment of income rules that would otherwise cause that partner,
as an individual, to recognize income sooner. The unprincipled
partnership holds the income on behalf of one partner for economic
purposes but the allocation rules allow the partnership to attribute the
income to another partner for tax purposes (which partner is exempt
from U.S. taxation, coincidentally). The next section presents the
proposed solution: partnerships must allocate tax items in accordance
with relative capital accounts unless the partners can shoulder a heavy
burden of showing that capital account allocations are inefficient in
light of their particular circumstance. If partners can meet their
burden, they should be allowed to allocate partnership items under a
more understandable PIP test.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: CAPITAL ACCOUNT ALLOCATIONS
AND A REVISED PIP TEST
The proposed solution to the efficiency and equity losses
occasioned under present law is based on one basic assumption.
Allocating partnership items strictly in accordance with relative
capital account balances may not be optimally efficient in certain rare
circumstances, but doing so is never inefficient. Thus, capital account
allocations should constitute the norm - the accurate safe harbor but in certain circumstances proven by the partners, the allocations
might be made in a different manner to achieve optimal economic
efficiency. One such circumstance involves a limited partnership
containing at least one general partner. In those situations, once a
limited partner's capital account is reduced to zero, even if the general
partner's capital account is also zero, no further allocations of loss or
deduction should be made to the limited partner except to the extent
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of that partner's obligation to contribute additional capital to the
partnership. 3 2

Allocations beyond that point will necessarily be

disproportionate to capital account balances because a limited
partner's capital account should not have a negative balance greater
than her restoration obligation.

A second

example involves

"waterfall" distributions designed to implement preferred returns of
capital. 133 The partners may agree that one partner is entitled to the
return of her residual capital before any other partners.

In those

circumstances, it is not inappropriate to allocate partnership loss in
the same order as distributions upon liquidation are to be made.13
There may be other circumstances justifying non-capital account
with current law to the extent it implicitly
allocations, though I agree
135
doubts the possibility.
Only brief argument need be made regarding the notion that
capital account allocations can never be inefficient. Current law

implicitly agrees as demonstrated by the regulatory presumption that
allocations should be shared on a "per capita" basis. 136 The discussion

of efficiency has centered on the notion that it is inefficient to
discourage or prevent the most productive use of property.
Advocates for flexibility make the same assertion - that in the
absence of a flexible taxing scheme applied to partnerships, partners
would not pool their capital and make the most productive use of it.
Thus, taxing owners on the yield from their capital is inefficient only if
the tax discourages or prevents productive use of the capital. Earlier
examples show that flexibility is not at all correlated to the utility

132

Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(d)

(2005) (regarding the impropriety of
allocating deductions to limited partners who are not obligated to contribute
additional capital).
133 See, e.g., id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 16(i).
'34 Id. Example 16(i), unlike other examples in the regulations, does not specify
that allocations must be made in accordance with relative capital. Cf. id. § 1.7041(b)(5), ex. 1(i)-(ii), 4(i), and 8(i). This seems to leave open the possibility that
allocations might be made in a manner consistent with the preferred liquidating
distributions.
135 The examples in Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) with respect to the
PIP test
demonstrate only capital account allocations or allocations as described in the text
with regard to limited partners and preferred distributions. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex.
16(i) (exemplifying waterfall allocations under the PIP standard); id. § 1.704-1(b)(5),
ex. 1(iv) and 15(ii) (exemplifying limited partner allocations under the PIP standard);
id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 1(i)-(ii), 4(i), and 8(i) (exemplifying capital account allocations
under the PIP standard). One might expect that the drafters anticipated as many
circumstances as possible.
136 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i).
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gains occurring when joint actors share risks and mutually strive for
profit. Flexibility in the representative partnership transactions is,
instead, correlated with opposite-end bargaining that coincidentally
occurs within a partnership. Partners use special allocations to create
bargains with respect to their capital or labor in the same manner and
taking into account the same risks as individuals. Hence, there is no
efficiency gain by taxing partners other than on a capital account
allocation system. That conclusion nearly proves the opposite point.
There is nothing inefficient in taxing the yield from capital strictly to
the owners in accordance with their relative ownership of the capital.
Doing so would be inefficient - by discouraging the productive use of
the property - only if the tax rate were so high as to be confiscatory.
This relates to the rate of tax, though, not to the identity of the
taxpayer. A confiscatory tax would discourage productive use of
capital no matter the identity of the taxpayer. Capital account
allocations, too, would discourage mutual striving for profit only if the
tax rate was confiscatory. In all other instances, capital account
allocations can be no more inefficient than taxation in general and in
any context.
As noted earlier, other scholars have suggested that capital
account allocations should be the only permissible system."'

The

present analysis is basically consistent with that approach but because
it is impossible to anticipate the entire universe of true partnership
economic arrangements - as opposed to opposite end bargaining
occurring within a partnership - I am not willing to completely
foreclose the possibility that non-capital account allocations may be
used. Indeed, we have identified two such circumstances. When a
limited partner's capital account is reduced to zero as a result of prior
pro rata allocations, no further allocations of loss can be allocated to
that partner because she is not obligated to pay the economic cost
corresponding to the loss. She cannot be expected to ever suffer the
economic burden corresponding to earlier allocation of loss
deduction. Thus future allocations of loss must be made to the
general partner in amounts disproportionate to their respective capital
accounts. Capital account allocations of loss in this instance would be
inefficient because it is the general partner who would bear the entire
economic burden. A rule mandating strict capital account allocations
would thus discourage the presence of a general partner. The second
circumstance involves preferred returns of capital. Mandating capital
account allocations in that instance would likewise discourage a

...See supra note 19.
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common risk ordering device.
When, as in the limited partner or preferred return examples,
capital account allocations would prove inefficient, subchapter K
should allow partners to allocate tax items in accordance with their
economic interest in the partnership. This is essentially the rule under
current law. If the partners' economic arrangement cannot be
structured to meet the substantial economic effect test, allocations are
tested under the partners' interest in the partnership test. This
proposal differs from current law and prior proposals in that it
eliminates the substantial economic effect test and replaces it with
capital account allocations as the safe harbor. A more precisely
defined PIP test would apply as well, but only when partners carried
the burden of proving the inefficiency of capital account allocations.
The current partners' interest in the partnership test has been
variously described as a "black hole,' 3 8 "nebulous and uncertain," '
and a standard about which "meaningful generalization.., is not
possible." ' 4° Those descriptions misconstrue the PIP test as an
proactive statement of how tax burdens should be allocated. As
explained below, the PIP test is entirely reactive. It accepts the notion
that disproportionate allocations are appropriate in the main and
merely reacts to those disproportionate outside the main. As such,
the PIP test does not proactively define anything.
The general PIP test is described as a function of four factors
designed to determine the true incidence of economic benefits and
burdens derived from the partnership: (1) the partners' relative
contributions to the partnership, (2) the interests of the partners in
economic profits and losses, (3) the interests of the partners in cash
flow and other non-liquidating distributions, and (4) the rights of the
partners to distributions of capital upon liquidation.
These factors
are to be applied in light of an initial, refutable presumption that
allocations are to be made in accordance with capital account
balances. 142
The regulations are conspicuously devoid of any
statement regarding
priority of consideration other than the initial
.. 143
presumption.
They are explained in thirteen examples that seem
Leder, supra note 14, at 753.
Schwidetzky, supra note 14, at 711.
140 Lawrence Lokken, PartnershipAllocations, 41 TAx L.
REv. 547,614 (1986).
141 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(ii)
(2005).
142 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i).
143 There are surprisingly few cases interpreting the PIP test. In one case, the
138
131

Tax Court merely went through the factors seriatim, without stating whether any
particular factor should be given more weight than any other. See Estate of James R.
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haphazard at first, but which actually demonstrate three separate
approaches.
Nevertheless, the syntactical structure of the PIP
regulation certainly does not help convey the intended meaning.
A second, more important reason why the PIP test seems
indecipherable is because the standard is reactive rather than
proactive. Like the substantial economic effect test, the PIP test
intends only to say that partners may do whatever they please insofar
as the division of tax benefits and burdens is concerned, but they may
not engage in illegitimate tax avoidance. Illegitimate tax avoidance is
defined and limited to any allocation that lacks economic effect or
predictably
• 144 results in tax reduction without a corresponding economic
reduction.
The regulatory articulation does not actually define any
partner's interest in a partnership. Instead, the PIP test merely
defines those allocations outside the substantial economic effect safe
harbor that are also not within a partner's interest in a partnership. It
is intended only as a reaction when illegitimate tax avoidance is
identified and
then
only to the extent necessary to prevent the
S
145
identified harm. Taxpayers will necessarily come away with a vague
and uncertain feeling if they mistakenly believe that the PIP test is
intended to proactively identify the economics of any partnership
structure.
A general standard, of course, ought to be articulated with the
greatest simplicity possible. The present PIP articulation violates this
rule of thumb but there are, nevertheless, three discernable, reactive
rules:
1. If allocations do not have economic effect because (a) the
partners do not maintain capital accounts in accordance with
the checking account rules, or (b) liquidations will not be
made in accordance with capital account balances, allocations
must be made on a pro rata basis unless the partners have
indicated a liquidation preference. In the latter instance,
allocations may be made in accordance with relative capital

Tobias v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1163 (2001).
144 See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
145 The substantiality requirement does not require capital
account allocations
even when illegitimate tax avoidance arising from disproportionate allocations is
objectively predictable. Instead, the requirement merely dictates that the allocations
in such circumstances be changed enough to eliminate the tax avoidance, though not
to the extent that the allocations are proportional. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex.
5, 6, 7, and 10(ii) (2005).
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146
or in the same order as the liquidation preference.

2. If an allocation does not have economic effect because (a)
the allocation will cause a capital account deficit greater than
a partner's deficit restoration obligation or (b) the
partnership agreement does not contain a qualified offset
provision, the item must be reallocated to the partners who
can be called upon to contribute more capital on a pro rata
basis. A corollary to this rule is that an unexpected deficit
greater than a partner's deficit restoration obligation will
trigger a priority disproportionate allocation of income
or
147
deficit.
the
eliminate
to
sufficient
gain to that partner
3. If an allocation has economic effect but shifts income or
character in a manner that reduces aggregate tax liability
without a corresponding economic reduction, the allocation
must be strictly in accordance with the partnership agreement
as it would appear without the provision that creates the
shift. 4 8
Earlier, it was noted that capital account allocations serve as the
implicit baseline against which allocations are tested for substantial
economic effect.149 Designating capital account allocations as the
proper baseline is both efficient and equitable because nobody has
identified any real partnership transaction or relationship that would
be rendered inefficient by such a rule, and the rule would ensure equal
treatment between partners and individuals. The first and second PIP
restatements can coexist with the capital account allocation approach
advocated in this article because they require allocations consistent
with residual ownership, even though preferred liquidating
distributions allow for preferred allocations to the extent of a
preferred partner's residual capital. The third, however, is not
consistent with the capital account allocation approach. The third
restatement necessarily implies that some non-capital account
allocations are legitimate as long as tax avoidance cannot be
objectively predicted. In effect, the third restatement would reinstate
the very same special allocation scheme condoned under present law
146

Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 1(i)-(ii), 4(i), 8(i), and 16(i).

147 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 1(iv) and 15(i).
148 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 5, 6, 7, and 10(ii).
149

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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but without the explicit imprimatur inherent to the substantial
economic effect safe harbor.
The foregoing analysis therefore leads to the following allocation
restatement. First, partners should allocate partnership items in the
same ratio as their relative ownership of capital.
In limited
partnerships and partnership with preferred liquidating distributions,
the PIP standard would allow disproportionate allocations without
further proof of inefficiency. In the unlikely event the partners can
prove that capital account allocations are inconsistent with another
special relationship that can be efficiently achieved only in the
partnership form, they should be allowed to make disproportionate
allocations."O This is an explicitly particularized determination about
which the regulations should not attempt to articulate standards. It is
simply impossible to anticipate the universe of transactions via
articulated standards. It is enough that the standard recognizes the
possibility of inefficiency, however much skepticism is warranted, and
thereby allows for case by case exceptions.
V.

CONCLUSION

A system that mandated capital account allocations as the
presumptive method, but then allowed for non-capital allocations so
long as the timing advantages were not objectively predictable would
essentially be the same as the present model. Partners could simply
rely on PIP restatements to obtain the illegitimate advantages
available under the present law substantial economic effect safe
harbor. On the other hand, a system should absolutely prohibit noncapital account allowances only if the arguments in favor of flexibility
can be categorically and universally dismissed.
Some scholars
implicitly or explicitly adopt this view. This article has argued only
that advocates for flexibility have not put forth any transaction or
particular partnership relationship that could not be achieved in the
150A skeptical approach that holds open the possibility of other circumstances is
consistent with other instances where the Internal Revenue Code expresses
skepticism with respect to a particular assertion but does not entirely foreclose the
possibility. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 706(b)(1)(C) (allowing partnerships to elect an
unspecified taxable year only if the partnership can convince the Secretary that a
business purpose exists for the selected taxable year); Treas. Reg. § 15A.4531(d)(2)(iii) (2005) ("Only in those rare and extraordinary cases involving sales for a
contingent payment obligation in which the fair market value of the obligation
(determinable under the preceding sentences) cannot reasonably be ascertained will
the taxpayer be entitled to assert that the transaction is "open." Any such transaction
will be carefully scrutinized to determine whether a sale in fact has taken place.").
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absence of flexibility while admitting that the entire universe of
transaction may yet be defined. It seems very doubtful that such
transactions exist, but it would not be imprudent to allow for the slim
possibility. While there has been no convincing efficiency argument in
favor of non-capital account allocations, there are significant equity
arguments against non-capital account allocations. Hence, the present
proposal would make capital account allocations mandatory except in
two occasions. First, non-capital account allocations would be
mandated with respect to limited or preferred partners. Second, noncapital account allocations would be permissible upon application to
the Secretary demonstrating the legitimate business need for the
deviation and why the business need cannot be accomplished without
the non-capital account allocation.
If partners can meet this
intentionally heavy burden, they should not be denied relief because
the non-capital allocation will result in a tax advantage relative to
individuals. This is consistent with the notion that efficiency gains
justify and compensate for equity losses. The theoretical baseline, of
course, is that efficiency and equity should exist in rough equilibrium.
The proposal with regard to non-capital account allocations would
adhere to that theoretical baseline.

